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MUST GOD BE DEAD OR IRRELEVANT: DRAWING A CIRCLE
THAT LETS ME IN
Richard M. Esenberg *
A BSTRACT
Some scholars claim that current Establishment Clause doctrine can increasingly
be explained in terms of substantive neutrality—that is, the idea that government
ought to treat religion and irreligion (or comparable secular activities) in the same
way. Whether a product of the Court’s commitment to the idea or an artifact of the
positions of the “swing” Justices, this proposition has considerable explanatory power.
The Supreme Court has, in recent years, permitted the government to make financial
support equally available for religious uses, as long as it is done on a neutral basis and
through the private choice of the recipients. It has required the government, in its
superintendence of general and limited purpose public forums, to treat comparable
religious and secular speakers identically.
But the Court has continued to insist upon a substantial degree of secularity with
respect to government speech. Some have argued that this is consistent with substantive neutrality as well. Government has but one voice and, while money and facilities
can be made available in a way that respects individual choice, prayers and messages
concerning religion cannot. Substantive neutrality, the argument continues, requires
government silence on religious matters.
The problem is that modern government is not—and probably cannot be—silent
on such matters. In addition, current doctrine is ambitious. It seeks to prevent even
very subtle injury to dissidents. As a consequence, it cannot protect religious objectors
to secular speech with religious implication in the same way it seeks to protect even
secular objectors from even the most bland of religious speech.
I argue that this asymmetry is not substantively neutral. Drawing, in part, on the
insights of post-liberal theology, I suggest that it permits the precise expressive harm
that Establishment Clause doctrine claims to seek to prevent—that is, permits religious
dissidents to feel they are disfavored members of the political community and allows
the state to influence religious formation. Drawing on theories regarding the value of
mediating institutions, including the Catholic notion of subsidiarity and the Calvinist
idea of sphere sovereignty, I maintain that this asymmetry is undesirable and offer a
less ambitious paradigm. Because we cannot protect the religious and secular from
subtle expressive injury in the same way, we ought not to try.
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I would like
to thank my colleagues at Marquette for their helpful comments at a workshop at which I
presented this paper. I would also like to thank my research assistants Matthew Fernholz and
Nathan Petrashek.
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P RELUDE
This past term in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,1 the Supreme Court once again
affirmed the “government speech doctrine”—the idea that the First Amendment’s Free
Speech Clause applies to government regulation of private speech, and not speech
by the government itself. 2 Applying the doctrine, the Court held that a municipal
display of a privately donated Ten Commandments monument in a public park was
1
2

129 S.Ct. 1125 (2009).
Id. at 1134.
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government speech 3 and not private speech within a traditional or limited purpose
public forum.4 The city, therefore, was under no obligation to accept and display a
monument setting forth the Seven Aphorisms of Summum.5 The Court rejected the
argument that the city was required to expressly endorse the message of the display
in order for it to qualify as government speech.6 It recognized, in fact, that at least in
the context of a public monument, government speech can be perceived to convey
a number of messages and the government cannot be presumed to have endorsed any
particular one. 7 If the state were forced to acknowledge and convey all messages
that compete with, or are complementary with these potential meanings, this would
substantially impair its ability to function.8
Although the Court recognized that government speech is subject to the Establishment Clause, the question of whether the Ten Commandments display was itself unconstitutional was not raised and, therefore, not decided. 9 Summum, then, does not itself
alter our Establishment Clause jurisprudence. But that jurisprudence, as it relates to
government speech, relies heavily on judicial divination of the message that such
speech “is” perceived to have “endorsed.”10 Nevertheless, Summum’s recognition that
government speech may convey a number of messages, and that evenhandedness in
that speech is impractical, suggests further clarification of just when and how government speech is limited by the Establishment Clause. In my view, not merely clarification, but a thorough re-thinking—is just what is required.
3

Id. at 1138.
Some public spaces such as streets, parks, and civic plazas that, by tradition and custom,
have been devoted to public assembly and debate have come to be regarded as traditional
public forums. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976). In such places, a speaker may be
excluded only if it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest, and that exclusion must
be narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,
112 (2001). Even public places not traditionally recognized for public assembly and debate
may become so by government policy. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983). A limited purpose public forum is created when the government designates
a forum for use by certain speakers or for the discussion of certain subjects. Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). In these circumstances, an
entire class of speakers or entire subjects may be excluded through the application of reasonable
restrictions on the content of the speech allowed. Id. But, crucially, those restrictions must
be viewpoint neutral. Id.
5
Summum is a religious organization grounded in elements of Gnostic Christianity. It
claims that its Seven Aphorisms were inscribed on the original tablets handed down by God
to Moses on Mount Sinai, but shared with only a select group of people. Today they can be
found on the church’s website, if not in Pleasant Grove City. Seven Summum Principles,
http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
6
Summum, 129 S.Ct. at 1129.
7
Id. at 1136.
8
Id. at 1131.
9
Id. at 1139.
10
See infra Part I. D.
4
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INTRODUCTION
In an earlier article, I told the story of Dick and Jane.
Dick is an atheist. He may be exposed to such things as voluntary prayer or a sticker on his textbook that identifies random
evolution as a theory and informs him that some people argue in
favor of an alternative theory called Intelligent Design. He is not
coerced to believe or proclaim anything. He is not told that his
ideas are wrong or untrue. He may feel left out. He may feel pressure to go along and affirm what many of his classmates affirm.
Jane is an evangelical Christian. She believes that God created
the world and all living things in it, but is taught that life arose
as a result of random chemical processes. She believes that premarital sex and homosexuality are sins, prohibited by God. She
is taught that gays and lesbians are exercising their individual
rights and are to be, if not celebrated, accepted. She is taught that
the decision to engage in pre-marital sex is hers alone and, while
(perhaps) inadvisable, is a decision that can be made on the basis
of considerations other than her religion, each of which she is invited to explore. She is consistently reminded that she is different.
She feels strong pressure to conform.
The harm, if that is what it is, suffered by Dick and Jane is similar.
Both may feel excluded on the basis of their religious views. Both
are reminded that a majority of their classmates—and the school
which each attends—embrace a different set of beliefs. Both are
subject to school and peer pressure to alter their own beliefs. But
it is a generally accepted view that only Dick has an Establishment
Clause remedy.11
Dick (or his parents) will certainly be able to enjoin the religious messages that
offend him, either because they violate the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 12 or
constitute a government endorsement of religion.13 The court would likely observe
11

Richard M. Esenberg, You Cannot Lose If You Choose Not to Play: Toward a More
Modest Establishment Clause, 12 R OGER W ILLIAM S U. L. R EV . 1, 36–37 (2006).
12
403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1999) (stating that state action must (1) “have a secular legislative purpose;” (2) have a “primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion;”
and (3) does not “foster ‘an excessive entanglement with religion’”).
13
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding
that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
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that “the preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere, which itself is promised freedom to pursue that mission.” 14 It would probably say, that even though Dick was not
required to affirm anything, “given our social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in
this milieu could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or
approval of it.” 15 Dick could reasonably conclude that the school has endorsed a
position on religion other than his own and, the court would conclude, that is constitutionally impermissible. This is because constitutional doctrine has developed in
a way that seeks to prevent government from neither “advanc[ing] nor inhibit[ing]
religion,” 16 or causing him to feel like an “outsider[ ], not [a] full member[ ] of the
political community.” 17
But the principles that protect Dick are of little help to Jane. Communications that
are inimical to her religious beliefs, but are not themselves expressed in “theological”
or “religious” language, are likely to be regarded as constitutionally permissible.18
A court would almost certainly say that “[p]ublic schools are not obliged to shield
individual students from ideas which potentially are religiously offensive.” 19
It might cite the observation of Justice Anthony Kennedy that, while “students
may consider it an odd measure of justice to be subjected during the course of their
educations to ideas deemed offensive and irreligious, but to be denied a brief, formal
prayer ceremony,” this “odd measure” of justice is precisely what the Establishment
Clause requires.20
Dick has been subjected to explicitly, if bland, religious language concerning,
however broadly, extratemporal matters. The messages to which Jane objects have
been couched in “secular” language. While one might distinguish a prayer or explicit
theological claims from the expression, or approval, of a position that contradicts a
dissenter’s religious beliefs, it is not clear that this distinction matters to the dissenter.21
questions of religious belief or from “making adherence to religion relevant in any way to
a person’s standing in the political community”).
14
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992) (holding that school may not sponsor prayer
at graduation ceremony).
15
Id. at 593.
16
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
17
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
18
Courts have repeatedly held that parents have no right to object to the provision of
secular information that is inconsistent with their religious beliefs. See, e.g., Fields v. Palmdale
Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005) (challenging school survey containing sexual
matter); Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 135 (2d Cir. 2003) (objecting to mandatory
health education course); Parents United for Better Schools, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia
Bd. of Educ., 148 F.3d 260, 262 (3d Cir. 1998) (objecting to condoms being distributed in
public schools); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1995)
(objecting to attendance at AIDS awareness assembly).
19
Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 106 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008).
20
Lee v. W eisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992).
21
See infra Part III.C.
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The notion that faith can be cabined into a private sphere largely concerned with
metaphysical assertions is itself a claim about what religion is or should be.22 It does
not comport with the best scholarship about how religious beliefs form, evolve and
are transmitted.23 Whatever harm might be caused by the government’s participation in the preservation and transmission of religious beliefs seems to be the same
whether that participation comes in the form of a bland non-denominational prayer
or the contradiction of a core belief.
Recognition of the asymmetry with which plaintiffs like Dick and Jane are
treated is not new,24 but a resolution has proven to be elusive. Some have attempted
to justify25 —and even celebrate 26 —the idea of asymmetry, while others have argued
that modification of doctrine—or sage policy—could alleviate the imbalance.27 Still
others have said that it is simply the best we can do.28
In a seminal article,29 Professor Naomi Maya Stolzenberg discussed the problem
in the context of Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 30 in which a group
of conservative Christians sought unsuccessfully to have their children excused from
certain readings that they found offensive to and contradictory to their religious
beliefs. The title of the article draws upon a concurrence by Judge Boggs, while
holding that the parents and their children had no constitutional right to be excused,
nevertheless expressed the difficulty of the case by quoting a portion of a poem by
Edward Markham:
He drew a circle that shut me out—
Heretic, Rebel, a thing to flout.
22

Dissenting in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Scalia questioned what he saw as the majority’s
assumption that religion is “some purely personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in
secret . . . in the privacy of one’s room. For most believers it is not that, and has never been.”
505 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism
and Federalism, 2003 C HI. L. R EV . 669, 676 (“[S]eparationism is neutral only within a set of
assumptions in respect to human nature and religion that many people do not share.”).
23
See infra Part II. B. 1.
24
See, e.g., Michael W . McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 N W . U.
L. R EV . 146, 162 (1986).
25
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W . V A . L. R EV . 51,
70–72 (2007).
26
See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and the Attack on Constitutional
Secularism, 2004 BYU L. R EV . 1005, 1017.
27
See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing
Something, 70 F O RD H AM L. R EV . 1147, 1195–96 (2002).
28
See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90
C O RN ELL L. R EV . 9, 78 (2004) (stating that the government could not function if it could not
vitiate religious views).
29
Naomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew A Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation,
Indoctrination and the Paradox of Liberal Education, 106 H ARV . L. R EV . 582 (1993).
30
827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
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But Love and I had the wit to win:
We drew a circle that took him in!31
In Judge Boggs’s view, the school board should have found a way to take the
children in, even if the Constitution did not compel it. 32 As we will see, the Mozert
plaintiffs did not raise the issue of Establishment Clause asymmetry. 33 They, and
most litigants bringing similar challenges in the intervening years, have sought only
to be excused from objectionable activities, relying more frequently on Free Exercise
than Establishment arguments. Nevertheless, Judge Boggs’s twenty-year-old regret
that a circle was not drawn to let in religious objectors to an ostensibly “secular”
government message remains unaddressed.
The purpose of this article is to challenge the asymmetrical treatment of Dick and
Jane. My point is not that schools and public spaces can be made completely acceptable to all manner of believers and non-believers, or that the sentiments of the Janes
of the world ought to be the measure of what can and cannot be said in public school
classrooms. Just as one school may have been entitled to solemnize a graduation
ceremony with a prayer, another school may have a legitimate interest in communicating a message about tolerance of those with differing sexual orientations. We ought
however, to seek to treat those who claim to be harmed by each proposal equally, and
a jurisprudence that seeks to protect dissenters from relatively slight injuries cannot
manage this.
I want to explore a new paradigm. One that seeks not a hopeless attempt to hold
dissenters harmless, but to promote tolerance of, and room for, dissenting religious beliefs. It draws on theological and sociological insights into the nature of religion and
its interaction with the larger society to argue that the harms suffered by those in the
position of Jane do not differ materially from those suffered by Dick. It borrows from
theories emphasizing the vital importance of a mediating institution, including churches
and religious organizations, to demonstrate why this asymmetry is undesirable.
Although some scholars have argued that respect for the independence of mediating institutions supports Establishment Clause asymmetry,34 I believe that, in light
of the role in our lives played by the contemporary state, the picture is more complicated. If the state seeks to address matters with which religion is concerned (and it
will), then it ought to have more room to facilitate the inclusion of religious perspectives. Everyone cannot be equally comfortable within the circle, but comfort ought not
to be a function of one’s willingness to accept public secularity and private religion.
Part I considers the current state of the law, and Part II demonstrates its asymmetrical treatment of government speech about religion. Part III argues that this asymmetry
31

Stolzenberg, supra note 29, at 584–85 (quoting Edwin M arkham, Outwitted, in T H E
B EST L O VED P O EM S O F THE A M ERICAN P EO PLE 37 (Hazel Felleman ed., 1936)).
32
Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1074.
33
See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
34
See infra Part III. B.
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interferes with individual liberty, is inconsistent with the notion of substantive neutrality that seems to inform, however fitfully, much of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and encroaches upon spheres of life with which religion is concerned. Our
jurisprudence fails, therefore, on its own terms. Part IV sets forth a new paradigm for
an asymmetrical Establishment Clause, rooted in a principle of nonestablishment.
I. A N A MBITIOUS N EUTRALITY
I have argued elsewhere that this asymmetry is born of ambition.35 It arises from
an effort to ensure that government do nothing to promote either religion or irreligion and that it not act in a way that might make nonadherents uncomfortable. But
seeking an evenhandedness that cannot be achieved requires that we fudge our insistence on neutrality, and, with respect to government speech, we fudge it in favor of
a public secularity that makes religious dissenters just as uncomfortable as public
religiosity would make nonadherents.
A. The Roots of Neutrality
Before assessing the problem, it is helpful to briefly trace its origin. The modern
era’s emphasis on neutrality of Establishment Clause jurisprudence began in Everson
v. Board of Education,36 holding that the prohibition against laws “respecting an
establishment of religion” was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and is
applicable to the states.37 Although Everson is traditionally associated with a rigorously
separationist view of disestablishment,38 the Court actually upheld the reimbursement
of the parents of parochial school children for money spent on transportation to and
from school. 39 Everson is best known, however, not for its result, but for its rhetoric.
35

Esenberg, supra note 11, at 24.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
37
Id. at 8; see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (holding the
religion clause applicable to the states in the context of free exercise claim).
38
See, e.g., Jonathan Mills, Strict Separationism’s Sacred Canopy, 39 A M . J. J U RIS . 397,
421 (1994) (“In formal argumentation though not in practice (for it did not invalidate New
Jersey legislation that provided transportation at public expense for Roman Catholic schools),
Everson is the founding strict separationism decision . . . .”); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death
of Separationism, 62 G EO . W ASH . L. R EV . 230, 233–34 (1994) (noting that the “dominant era
of separationism” began in 1947 with the Court’s Everson decision). Lupu states that “Everson
is best and most importantly remembered for its broad separationist dicta and for the Court’s
unanimous adoption of the Virginia history of religious liberty as the key to the meaning of the
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.” Id. He further states that “[t]his historical account,
which placed James Madison and his justly famed (and staunchly separationist) Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments at the heart of the meaning of the Establishment
Clause, became the ‘official’ history of the clause until challenged by scholars and justices in
the early 1980s.” Id.
39
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
36
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Justice Black’s first move was to emphasize religion as something uniquely
inflammatory and potentially corrupting. 40 Writing for the majority, Justice Black
argued that disestablishment was rooted in the uniquely divisive nature of religion
as well as the special importance of religious liberty. 41 He pointed to early colonial
settlers fleeing a Europe “filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated
in large part by established sects determined to maintain their absolute political and
religious supremacy.”42 “In efforts to force loyalty,” he wrote “to whatever religious
group happened to be on top and in league with the government of a particular time
and place, men and women had been fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed.”43
Justice Black also pointed to colonial impositions on religious liberty—Catholics
“hounded and proscribed,” Quakers sent “to jail”—that “shock[ed] the freedom-loving
colonials into a feeling of abhorrence.” 44 This prompted the framers to eschew a
national establishment.
It would be a mistake, however, to attribute Justice Black’s concern over the
dangers of religion to anti-clericalism or a hostility to religion. Religion may be dangerous, in his view, because its adherents regard it as fundamental to their identity and
essential to life in this world and beyond. This is presumably behind both the temptation to abuse and the integral value of religious freedom.45
But, although he found disestablishment to be rooted in an abhorrence of coercive practices and direct establishments, Justice Black’s second move was to read the
mandate of nonestablishment as reaching well beyond these evils that prompted its
enactment.46 If religion is especially divisive or a strong temptation for the abuse
of power, coercion or the creation of a state church may not be the only evil to be
avoided.47 If religious freedom is a special form of liberty, then the state may imperil it in other ways:
Not only, in his view, can the government not establish a church,
it cannot “aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another” and “[n]either a state nor the Federal Government
can openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa.” Not only may it not participate in coercive practices, it ought not to “force nor influence

40

Id. at 8–10.
Id. at 13–14.
42
Id. at 8–9.
43
Id. at 9.
44
Id. at 10–11.
45
Id. at 11–12 (citing the arguments of Madison and Jefferson).
46
See, e.g., Carlton Morse, A Political Process Theory of Judicial Review Under the
Religion Clauses, 80 S. C AL. L. R EV . 793, 807–08 (2007).
47
Id. at 808.
41
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a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.” 48
In Everson, Justice Black suggested that the best policy might be separation.
Echoing James Madison’s famous demand that not “three pence” be taxed to support
religion, 49 Justice Black wrote that “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.” 50
The principle of disestablishment, in his view, reflected “the conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was stripped
of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere
with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.” 51 Thus his ringing conclusion
that “[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall
must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.” 52
This wall of separation has never been as high or steadfast as Justice Black’s language might suggest. From the beginning (as Everson’s result suggests), there has
been a counter-theme, suggesting that, if religious liberty is an important objective,
separation may not always advance it. Thus began a theme of neutrality between religion and irreligion—a formulation that has been repeated over the intervening decades. It is conceivable that separation might mean a state promotion of secularity
but disestablishment in America has never meant that.
In Everson itself, for example, Justice Black observed that the First Amendment
“requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers
and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary: State power is
no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.” 53 Nevertheless, after Everson, the avoidance of establishment has been understood to require
more than the absence of coercion or an established church. But it is also understood
to require a neutrality between religion and irreligion.
The ambition of Everson was extended to government speech in Engel v. Vitale.54
The Court, perhaps for the first time, found a practice that was clearly not coercive,
at least in the traditional sense, to violate the Establishment Clause.55 A school district
48

Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16 (internal citations omitted).
J AM ES M AD ISO N , Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2
W RITIN GS O F J AM ES M AD ISO N 183, 186 (G. Hunt ed., 1901).
50
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
51
Id. at 11.
52
Id. at 18.
53
Id.
54
370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
55
Judge Michael McConnell has argued that Engel is the first case to clearly abandon
coercion as an element of establishment. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element
of Establishment, 27 W M . & M ARY L. R EV . 933, 934–35 (1987); see, e.g., Cantwell v.
49
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in New Hyde Park, New York, acting upon the recommendation of the State Board
of Regents, adopted a policy requiring teachers to begin each school day by reciting
a brief prayer: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.” 56 No student
was required to recite the prayer.57
In finding recitation of the prayer “wholly inconsistent with the Establishment
Clause,” 58 Justice Black once again found that the purpose of nonestablishment was
rooted in reaction to coercive and exclusionary practices materially different in degree
and kind from the Regents’ prayer.59 He again made clear, however, that such practices did not define the reach of the constitutional command:
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion
and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not. This is not to say, of course, that
laws officially prescribing a particular form of religious worship
do not involve coercion of such individuals. When the power,
prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved
religion is plain. But the purposes underlying the Establishment
Clause go much further than that.60
Engel further advanced the notion of nonestablishment as strict separation, but
it also continued to root separation in, not only the avoidance of division, but the
service of religious liberty, emphasizing the division that stemmed from historic
(coercive) practices and seeing nonestablishment as reflecting the principle that
“religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’
by a civil magistrate.” 61
The next term, in Abington School District v. Schempp,62 the Court found unconstitutional a requirement for the daily reading of scripture passages and recitation of
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (finding that the Establishment Clause “forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship”).
56
Engel, 370 U.S. at 422.
57
Id. at 430.
58
Id. at 424.
59
Justice Black focused, in particular, on controversies in England around the content of
the Book of Common Prayer, which was, of course, a dispute over what the state would require
in religious services conducted by a national church. Id. at 425–29.
60
Id. at 430–31.
61
Id. at 432.
62
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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the Lord’s Prayer.63 Although students could be excused,64 the Court once again made
clear that the establishment prohibition, unlike the guarantee of free exercise, need
not involve coercion.
The Free Exercise Clause, likewise considered many times here,
withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion
of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions
thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise
case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The distinction between the two clauses is apparent—a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause
violation need not be so attended.65
Nonestablishment, in the view of the Abington majority, required a separation grounded
in neutrality. It requires that government action have “a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.” 66
Justice Clark, writing for the Court, emphasized that nonestablishment placed the
state in a position of “wholesome ‘neutrality’” regarding religion such that every person
might “freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion
from the state.” 67
Separation was again thought to serve that end. But our counterpoint remained
present. Justice Goldberg, concurring, warned that:
[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that
noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which
the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not only not compelled by the Constitution,
but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it.68
What is significant for our purposes is that Everson and Engel reflect a turn away from
reading the Establishment Clause to bar only classic establishments and coercive or
punitive government practices. More specifically, Everson and, in particular, Engel
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

205–06.
205.
222–23.
222.

at 306.
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began a doctrinal quest for a neutrality that could serve religious liberty and equality
and completely ban the heavy hand of the state from its citizens’ religious lives.
B. The Imperative of Neutrality
But, in and of itself, neutrality makes sense only in light of ground rules—that is,
some sense of that state of affairs with respect to which we must be neutral.69 Does
the absence of religion constitute a neutrality that is disturbed by its inclusion? Or
does neutrality require its inclusion? We need a theory of how things should be. That
this reference point is not readily identified is suggested by the point and counter-point
of avoiding, on the one hand, establishment of religion and, on the other, its inhibition.
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky argues that there are three competing conceptions of
nonestablishment among the Justices.70 Each represents a different conception of neutrality. One view is strictly separationist, committed to a relatively robust quarantine
of religion from the precincts of government.71 The state—all that it does and all that
it pays for—should be secular.72 This may be expressed in terms of neutrality,73 but
it is a neutrality predicated upon a certain view of religion. If you believe that religion is private and can be separated from all or most of what concerns the modern
state, then evenhandedness and equality may well be served by exclusion.74 For separationist judges and scholars, the baseline for assessing neutrality is secular. No mention of religion, or funding to individuals for religious purposes, or use of facilities
by religious groups is neutral because all religious groups are excluded. There are
certainly cases in which that type of neutrality seems to have prevailed. 75 In practice
69

Rosen, supra note 22, at 707 (citing Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at the
Crossroads, 59 U. C HI. L. R EV . 115, 148–49 (1992)). Professor Rosen reminds us that any such
baseline is “nonaxiomatic and contestable.” Id. There is no objective “view from nowhere.”
Id. (borrowing the phrase from T H O M AS N AGEL , T H E V IEW F RO M N OW HERE 6 (1986)).
70
Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Church and State Should Be Separate, 49 W M . & M ARY L.
R EV . 2193, 2196–98 (2008); see also Esenberg, supra note 11, at 11, 14, 18 (describing a separationist, accommodationist, and “ambitious” Establishment Clause, with the latter rooted in
a concept of endorsement neutrality).
71
Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 2196.
72
Id.
73
See, e.g., M cCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“The touchstone for
our analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates government neutrality between
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’” (citing Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))).
74
See, e.g., W allace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985) (concluding that religion is a
“product of free and voluntary choice”); W isconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that “[r]eligion is an individual experience”); Everson
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 39 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (noting that James Madison
considered religion to be “wholly private”).
75
See, e.g., note 37 and cases cited therein; see also Lee v. Weissman, 505 U.S. 577 (1993);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist.
of Abington, Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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(if not in rhetoric), this view does not emphasize neutrality between religion and
irreligion because it is less likely to see them in conflict.
Another view is accommodationist.76 Although Dean Chemerinsky describes
this view as holding that the Establishment Clause can only be violated by the literal
establishment of a church or the coercion of religious participation,77 it is unclear that
any Justice has ever taken such an extreme view. 78 What is key is that judicial and
academic accommodationists believe that nonestablishment leaves room for some
substantial facilitation and acknowledgment of religion by the state.79 Once again,
accommodationists may also speak in terms of neutrality, 80 but it is a neutrality that
emphasizes the value of religion in civil society. When accommodationists are more
likely to have in mind an evenhandedness among religions, rather than between religion and irreligion. 81 The baseline for determining governmental neutrality is something like our historic regard and acknowledgment of either a generic monotheism or
the Judeo-Christian tradition. 82 For accommodationists, de-emphasis of neutrality
between religion and irreligion does not stem from a failure to see them in conflict
as much as it does from the view that evenhandedness between them, (as opposed to
among religions) is not required.
A third view also argues in terms of governmental neutrality toward religion.83
In fact, Dean Chemerinsky calls it the “neutrality” approach 84 probably because, with
some justification, he believes that the other two approaches are not neutral at all. On
this view, government must remain neutral among religions and between religion and
76

Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 2197–98.
Id.
78
Even Justice Scalia, for example, argued that the state may not endorse any particular
form of monotheism. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 893–94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79
Justice Scalia, for example, has argued that there was no basis in the Constitution’s
text, nor in our society’s historic or current understanding of the words, for the majority’s
conclusion that “manifesting a purpose to favor adherence to religion generally is unconstitutional” (citations omitted). Id. at 889; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687
(2005) (plurality opinion) (recognizing “the role of God in our Nation’s heritage”); Lee v.
W eisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting with approval Justice
Kennedy’s partial dissent in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989), in which
he recognized that the Establishment Clause must be construed in light of the “[g]overnment
policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion [that] are an accepted
part of our political and cultural heritage”).
80
See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority opinion had the effect of approving a program that socially discriminated against
religion, and that such approval was inconsistent with the court’s prior decisions mandating
neutrality); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
81
See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that tests measuring
only neutrality could lead to hostility against religion).
82
See id.
83
Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 2197.
84
Id. at 2197, 2209.
77
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irreligion.85 This form of neutrality recognizes the dangers warned of in the countertheme we found in Everson and Engel and related cases. 86 There are circumstances
in which separation is not neutral. Borrowing from Douglas Laycock,87 I want to
refine Dean Chemerinsky’s taxonomy by calling this view substantive neutrality,
meaning the imperative that the state act in a way which, insofar as it is possible, ensures each person might freely choose his or her religious course free of government
interference.88 To achieve this, the state must often treat religious activities as it treats
comparable secular activities in order to maintain evenhandedness, but it must avoid
endorsing any particular religion or religion (or secularism) in general.
It is unclear that any of these three views (which are, of course, held to differing
degrees and applied differently even by Justices identified with one “camp”) currently
commands a majority on the Court. Most recently, the Justices emphasizing substantive neutrality have, depending on the case, joined with the Justices more committed
to separation or accommodation to form a majority.89
C. The Triumph of Substantive Neutrality
In cases involving public funding of private activities and private access to public
facilities, the result has been the functional triumph of substantive neutrality—the idea
that government treats religious activities in the same way it treats comparable secular
activities. This avoids tilting the influence of public funding or the use of public
facility toward any particular religion or toward religion or irreligion in general.
1. Public Funding
The Court has shown a broad willingness to permit government funding of faith
based services as long as the choice of those alternatives was made by an individual
and there remains a private secular alternative. It has upheld tax deductions for expenses connected with sending children to private schools, including religious ones,90
85

Id. at 2197.
See supra notes 38–39.
87
Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 N W . U. L. R EV . 1, 3 (1986).
88
Id.
89
For example, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy joined
with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas to uphold vouchers for use in
sectarian schools. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Dean Chemerinsky sees the Court’s tangled decision
in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, as reflecting the way in which “neutralist” Justices O’Connor
and Blackmun saw the differing expressive nature of a nativity scene and a menorah. 492 U.S.
573 (1989) (finding a Christmas nativity display unconstitutional while permitting a large
Chanukah menorah to be displayed). The former, in their view, sent a message of religious
endorsement while the latter did not. Id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 2198–2200.
90
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
86
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educational grants to be used at sectarian colleges, 91 sign language interpreters to be
used by a student at a sectarian school, 92 grants to religiously affiliated organizations
for sexuality and pregnancy counseling,93 funding for remedial education in religious
schools,94 and direct aid for instructional materials to pervasively sectarian schools.95
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 96 the Court upheld Ohio’s school voucher plan
permitting families in Cleveland to receive tuition aid for both secular and sectarian
private schools. Because the program had the valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system,
and provided assistance directly to citizens who themselves directed the aid to religious schools, the program did not violate the Establishment Clause.97 Writing for
a 5-4 majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued:
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to
religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private
choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause.98
This movement seeks substantive neutrality, at least with respect to what the
Constitution permits the government to do. If the state is, for example, going to
finance public education or other services, then substantive neutrality is served by
making similar resources available for comparable parochial education and services
provided by religious organizations.

91

W itters v. W ash. Dep’t of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
93
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1987).
94
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
95
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
96
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
97
Id. at 662–63. Evenhandedness between religious and secular uses of neutrally available funds may not, however, be required. In Locke v. Davey, the Court held that the state of
W ashington could refuse to permit the use of a generally available scholarship program to
fund preparation for the ministry without violating a student’s free exercise rights. 540 U.S.
712 (2004). Some scholars have argued that Locke permits, but does not require, state discrimination in favor of a secular state. See, e.g., Richard S. Myers, The Privatization of Religion
and Catholic Justices, 47 J. C ATH . L EG . S TUD . 157, 161 (2008) (stating that neutrality is a matter
of “legislative grace”); Laura S. Underkuffler, Davey and the Limits of Equality, 40 T U LSA
L. R EV . 267, 268, 272 (2004). Locke may also represent the Court’s aversion to the argument
that the government might be required to fund religious activities. See Frederick Mark Gedicks,
The Establishment Clause Gag Reflex, 2004 BYU L. R EV . 995, 1001.
98
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
92

2009]

M UST G OD B E D EAD OR IRRELEVANT

17

2. “Private” Speech in Public Places
The Court has also permitted substantial private religious expression in places
or fora that the government funds or controls. For example, the Court has held that
student religious groups were entitled to equal access to university facilities, generally
available to other student groups,99 and upheld that the Federal Equal Access Act,
guaranteeing student religious groups access to school facilities made generally available to other extracurricular groups during noninstructional time.100 It has held that the
state must permit a cross on a state-owned plaza that was a traditional public forum,
open generally to private speech,101 and ruled similarly in cases involving more limited
public fora, holding that public school facilities made available to the public during
nonschool hours must be made available to a church group that wished to show a film
on child rearing.102
The key move, however, was made in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia; the Court held that the University of Virginia could not deny
funding to a religious group seeking to publish a Christian magazine where funding
for this purpose was made available to other student groups.103 Notwithstanding the
pervasively religious content of the publication, the majority held that this constituted nothing more than a particular perspective toward which the state, having chosen
to fund private speech, was required to be neutral.104 Once again, the Court declined
to regard a state mandated secularity as religiously neutral and rejected the notion
that a neutral program of funding private religious speech in public spaces is impermissibly divisive.105
Rosenberger was extended in Good News Club v. Milford Central School.106
The Court held that a school which allowed after-school use of its building by any
group promoting the moral and character development of children could not deny
use to a Christian club that wished to use the space for Bible study, prayer, and moral
instruction. 107 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas was untroubled by Justice
Souter’s suggestion that the program involved worship, observing that it still constituted moral instruction, and rejected the suggestion that “reliance on Christian
principles taints moral and character instruction in a way that other foundations for
99

W idmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
101
Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
102
See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–94
(1993).
103
515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995).
104
See id. at 845–46.
105
See id.
106
533 U.S. 98, 111–12 (2001).
107
See id. at 108–112 (“Milford’s exclusion of the club from use of the school, pursuant
to its community use policy, constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.”).
100
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thought or viewpoints do not.”108 Once again, neutrality was thought to require
inclusion of religious uses in a forum made available on a neutral basis.109
Professor Laycock sees Zelman as substantively neutral. It “creates no incentives
to choose religious or secular education” and “protects individual choice; each family
can choose for itself which school to attend.” 110
The quest for substantive neutrality is expressed in the Court’s on-again, 111 offagain,112 test of nonestablishment, first announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 113 requiring that a government action: “First . . . must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the [action] must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement
with religion.’” 114 It is, as we will see, reflected in former Justice O’Connor’s view
that religious expression by the state is forbidden when its purpose or effect is to endorse religion or nonreligion, or one religion over another. Endorsement, in her
view, “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community.” 115
D. Government Speech: Substantive Neutrality Becomes Endorsement Neutrality
But, in the realm of government speech, substantive neutrality cannot mean state
evenhandedness between private choices. The government often has only one voice
(or, in some circumstances, a relatively limited number of voices). There are only so
many monuments and village hall displays that can be erected. Only so many invocations can be offered at graduation. While funding and forums may be neutrally available to all religious and secular comers, the government often wishes to express a
distinctive point of view and, when the government itself is speaking, that message
will bear its imprimatur.116 Because, in most circumstances in which the government
speaks, everyone cannot be accommodated, the argument goes, we ought to expect
religious expression to be off-limits. In the case of government speech, substantive
neutrality requires separation. The state, if it can, and, as we shall see, it cannot, ought
say nothing at all on religious matters.
108

Id. at 111.
As noted at the outset, government speech does not create a public forum and thus
does not create an obligation to communicate or permit other views. See Pleasant Grove City
v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009).
110
Laycock, supra note 25, at 71.
111
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (invoking Lemon).
112
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (declining to apply Lemon yet decided the same
day as McCreary).
113
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
114
Id. at 612–13 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
115
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
116
Id. at 72. (“[M]oney can be delivered in a way that is consistent with individual choice.
Prayers cannot. Neither can scripture, creeds, Christmas displays, or any other speech promoting or denigrating religion.”).
109
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So, while the Court has allowed significant interaction between religion and government in the areas of public aid and private speech in certain public fora, government
speech must remain relatively religion-free.117 The Court has banned and compelled
voluntary prayer in school settings.118 It has struck down laws calling for a moment
of silence when persuaded of its religious provenance 119 and the Court invalidated a
state requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted in public classrooms.120
In Epperson v. Arkansas, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolution because the prohibition was based upon certain religious views and
thus violated the constitutional mandate of neutrality. 121 In Edwards v. Aguillard,
the Court struck down a law requiring schools to teach “creation science” as well as
evolutionary theory where it found the mandate to be religiously motivated.122
Religious discourse is excluded from the public sphere not only when the government is the speaker, but when it sponsors—or a reasonable observer might conclude
that it has sponsored—religious speech. If government permits religious speech in a
context where it exercises control over the message or otherwise facilitates “religious
expression” in a way that may be characterized as granting its imprimatur, courts may
conclude that it is government sponsored and, therefore, prohibited.
In Lee v. Weisman, 123 the Court held that a school could not provide for nonsectarian prayer by a clergyperson at a graduation ceremony. The prayers—an invocation
and benediction—were a brief nonparticipatory statement of a generic monotheism
implying no more than that there is a God whose care can be invoked. Writing for
the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy allowed that “students may consider it an
odd measure of justice to be subjected during the course of their educations to ideas
deemed offensive and irreligious, but to be denied a brief, formal prayer ceremony that
the school offers in return,” yet Kennedy was himself untroubled.124 The Court noted
that “for many, if not most, of the students at the graduation, the act of standing or remaining silent was an expression of participation in the [R]abbi’s prayer.” 125 In the
view of the majority, the “perseveration and transmission of religious beliefs and
worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere, which itself
117

Government may, under certain circumstances, communicate “objectively” about religion, although the legal rigor required to do so may often operate as a disincentive to even
try. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
118
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
119
See, e.g., W allace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985) (finding that an Alabama law
that “authorized a period of silence ‘for meditation or voluntary prayer’” violated the First
Amendment).
120
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
121
See 393 U.S. 97, 107–09 (1968).
122
See 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987).
123
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
124
Id. at 591.
125
Id. at 593.
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is promised freedom to pursue that mission.” 126 Because “given our social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or approval of it,” Deborah had a right to be free of it.127
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court held that even student-led
and student-initiated prayers at high school football games, at least where conducted
pursuant to a school policy authorizing an invocation of some sort, amounted to an
unconstitutional endorsement of religion.128
At first blush, this greater willingness to require the exclusion of religious perspectives can also be seen as a guest for substantive neutrality among religions and
between religion and irreligion—one that focuses on the message communicated by
government speech. In the context of government speech, substantive neutrality looks
a lot like Justice O’Connor’s principle of nonendorsement. In her view, “government must not make a person’s religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the
political community by conveying a message ‘that religion or a particular religious
belief is favored or preferred.’”129 Whether or not endorsement has occurred is to be
determined by a reasonable observer, familiar with the text and background of both
the First Amendment and of the challenged practice.130
Although a majority of the Court has not expressly adopted nonendorsement,
either generally or with respect to government speech cases,131 the principle has great
explanatory power. 132 Consider, as an example, the Court’s most recent cases on
public displays of the Ten Commandments.

126

Id. at 589.
Id. at 593. In his dissent, Justice Scalia observed that while we live in “a vulgar age,”
our social conventions “have not coarsened to the point that anyone who does not stand on
his chair and shout obscenities can reasonably be deemed to have assented to everything said
in his presence.” Id. at 637.
128
530 U.S. 290, 306–07, 313 (2000) (“[T]he religious liberty protected by the Constitution
is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.”).
129
Id. at 627 (O’Connor J., concurring) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)).
130
Some courts have seen the endorsement test as a refinement of the first two prongs in
Lemon (i.e., “purpose” and “effect”), see for example Ind. Civ. Liberties Union v. O’Bannon,
259 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1162 (2002) (calling the focus on
the first two prongs of the Lemon test the “endorsement test”), while others have considered
it to be a refinement of the effects prong. See, e.g., ACLU v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 503
(6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1152 (2005) (“[I]n evaluating the ‘effects’ prong of
the Lemon test, I apply the ‘endorsement test.’”).
131
Thomas Berg has argued that, although the nonendorsement principle may be appropriate
for government speech cases, it is not appropriate as a general requirement of the Establishment
Clause. See Thomas Berg, What’s Right and Wrong with “No Endorsement,” 21 W ASH . U.
J. L. & P O L’Y 307, 308 (2006).
132
See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 25, at 70 (suggesting that with respect to the Establishment
Clause, substantive neutrality and the protection of individual religious choice can explain
votes of Justices Kennedy and O’Connor).
127
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In McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union, a 5-4 plurality held that
a municipal display of the Ten Commandments, even when accompanied by materials
designed to emphasize their historic role in the development of law and displayed in
conjunction with secular materials, was unconstitutional.133 The display was original;
and the county, having initially displayed only the Ten Commandments, added additional nontheistic documents only in response to allegations that the initial display was
unconstitutional.134 Writing for the majority, Justice Souter emphasized the governmental purpose for the display, concluding that, in this context, the display was intended to—and did—convey a religious message secondary to a religious objective.135
Justice Souter insisted that he was not advocating “judicial psychoanalysis of a
drafter’s heart of hearts,”136 but what an “‘objective observer’” would conclude about
the government’s purpose based upon “traditional external signs.” 137
This emphasis on the expressivist nature of government actions that this reasonable observer is thought to discern, turned out to be dispositive in Van Orden v.
Perry,138 decided the same day as McCreary. Van Orden also involved a display of
the Ten Commandments, this time a free standing monument that had stood on the
grounds of the State Capitol in Austin, Texas for over forty years.139 Unlike the display in McCreary, the Commandments were not paired with other historic sources of
law. Eight Justices thought the case was substantially the same as McCreary.140
Justice Breyer disagreed and this made all the difference. For Justice Breyer, a
reasonable observer, in spite of its expressly religious content, would not (or, perhaps
more accurately, should not) perceive a religious message.141 The display in Van
Orden had stood for over forty years.142 The absence of controversy for most of that
period demonstrated that the reasonable observer would “consider the religious aspect
of the tablets’ message as part of what is a broader moral and historical message
reflective of a cultural heritage.” 143 In other words, the Van Orden display stood
because, at least in the mind of Justice Breyer, if no one else, it did not endorse the
religious sentiments it expressed.
133

545 U.S. 844, 856–57, 881 (2005). With respect to the Establishment Clause, substantive
neutrality and the protection of individual choice in religious matters can explain the votes
of Justices Kennedy and O’Connor regarding government funding and government speech.
See Laycock, supra note 25, at 70.
134
See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 851–57.
135
See id. at 868–73.
136
Id. at 862.
137
Id.
138
See 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005).
139
See id. at 681–82.
140
Only Justice Breyer disagreed. See id. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring).
141
See id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]hese factors provide a strong . . . indication
that the Commandments’ text on this monument conveys a predominantly secular message.”).
142
See id.
143
Id. at 702–03 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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II. T HE A SYMMETRICAL E STABLISHMENT C LAUSE
A. The Ambition of Nonendorsement
In and of itself, the prohibition of certain forms of endorsement might be a useful
guiding principle. But the ambition of nonendorsement, first made clear in Engel,
Abington, and Lee and as detailed by Justice Breyer in Van Orden, is staggering.
As noted earlier, and consistent with the theme originating in Everson, Engel and
Abington, endorsement can be very slight. 144 The endorsement can be vague enough
to encompass the views of almost everyone. Engel and Lee, for example, involved
brief nondenominational prayers, endorsing no theological propositions other than
that there is a God who, perhaps, responds to intercessory prayer.145 Endorsement of
a religious perspective need not involve any claim of exclusive truth or affirmation.146
It can even consist of a speech that expressly disavows endorsement, merely acknowledging religious sentiment or belief as a source of our democracy or as something
which is or has been believed by some of us at some time.147 Prohibited endorsement
can occur even when the burden is conceded to be minimal or without any real assessment of the likelihood that it will have any real impact on religious choices.148 We
144

See id. at 694–95 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court’s precedent permits even the
slightest public recognition of religion to constitute establishment of religion.”). See infra
note 143.
145
See supra Part I.A., Part I.D.
146
No modern Establishment Clause case considered by the Court involves such a claim,
other than in the sense that facilitating invocations of God implies that there is one and that
those who say there is not must be wrong.
147
See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 870–71 (2005) (“Foundations of
American Law and Government” exhibit included Ten Commandments on display with other
documents thought significant on historical foundation of American government). But see,
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644–45 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Given the odd basis for
the Court’s decision, invocations and benedictions will be able to be given at public school
graduations next June, as they have for the past century and a half, so long as school authorities
make clear that anyone who abstains from screaming in protest does not necessarily participate in prayers.”).
148
As Justice Thomas has observed, students exposed to what was taken as a statesponsored prayer at a graduation ceremony are not “‘coerced to pray’” but “[a]t most, . . . are
‘coerced’ into possibly appearing to assent to the prayer.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 47 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). One separationist scholar has
observed:
“Many of the state actions the Supreme Court has deemed to violate the
Constitution over the years have involved intangible establishments. That
is, constitutional violations have often come in the form of state actions
that do not actually force anyone to do anything against their personal
faith, but rather simply communicate that the government favors some
form of religion in the abstract.”
Stephen G. Gey, The No Religion Zone: Constitutional Limitations on Religious Association
in the Public Sphere, 85 M IN N . L. R EV . 1885, 1910 (2001).
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require the government to not simply avoid intolerance, but to adhere to a rather elaborate etiquette of sensitivity. 149 A holiday crèche scene might be unconstitutional
even if combined with a Chanukah menorah,150 but may be permissible if displayed
in a way, such as alongside secular symbols, that convinces a majority—or the Justice
or Justices casting the deciding votes—that, as in Van Orden, no endorsement was
intended or reasonably perceived.151
Shortly following Justice O’Connor’s promulgation of the endorsement list,
Stephen Smith identified at least four forms of endorsement, roughly labeled: (1) exclusive preferment of a belief; (2) endorsement of the truthfulness of a belief; (3) endorsement of the value of a belief; and, (4) recognition that many have believed.152
Following the Court’s decisions in McCreary and Van Orden, it seems that a slim
majority of the Court believes that, at least, the first three may all be forbidden by
the Establishment Clause.
There seems to be no doubt that if the government claimed explicitly that all
believers are irrational (exclusive preferment) or that “Jesus saves” (endorsement of
truthfulness), the Establishment Clause would be violated. It is hard to see how communication of the value of a particular religious belief would steer clear of Establishment Clause difficulty, given, for example, invalidation of laws providing for moments
of silence,153 informing students of alternative views of the origins of life,154 or acknowledging the importance of the Ten Commandments in the development of the Western
legal tradition.155 If a purpose to validate or advance that belief is seen as dispositive,
government would walk a fine line in ever suggesting the value of any religious belief.
It may be that only where, as in Van Orden, a court (or at least the decisive vote
on a court) can conclude no claim is made, or perceived, regarding the value of a belief, that a government statement concerning that belief, if it is religious, can stand.
149

For example, in Doe v. Beaumont Ind. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462, 464 (5th Cir. 2001),
the Court held that an issue of fact existed as to whether a volunteer “Clergy In the Schools”
counseling program was an establishment, notwithstanding that the clergy were required to
speak from a secular perspective and wore no religious garb. Apparently their mere identity
was problematic. Upon remand, the district court found that the program constituted an establishment. See Oxford v. Beaumont Ind. Sch. Dist., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1114 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
150
See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 614–15 (1989) (“The mere fact
that Pittsburgh displays symbols of both Christmas and Chanukah does not end the constitutional inquiry.”).
151
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680–81 (1983).
152
See Stephen D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 M ICH . L. R EV . 266, 276–77 (1987).
153
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985) (striking down a law authorizing
a period of silence at school for prayer or meditation).
154
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596–97 (1987) (finding unconstitutional
a law that required either the banishment of teaching evolutionary theory in the classroom or
the presentation of a religious view rejecting the theory).
155
See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 856–58 (2005) (recognizing that
the Ten Commandments greatly influenced W estern legal thought).
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Because endorsement may be implicit—may, in fact, be found even where it claims
to be something else 156—one wonders how often endorsement in the fourth sense (a
recognition that many have believed) will be permitted.157
Again, my point is not that the injury suffered by those in the position of Deborah
Weisman is not real. Nor do I wish to argue that there are no injuries of this type that
deserve constitutional remedy. At this point, I mean only to observe that the Court’s
jurisprudence seeks to avoid a wide variety of subjective psychological injury and to
impose upon the state a rather exacting expressive goal.
Justice Breyer, without apparent irony, recently summed up that goal.158 The
purpose of the religion clauses is to promote “the fullest possible scope of religious
liberty” and “tolerance for all.”159 They must be interpreted to avoid “divisiveness”
by maintaining “separation of church and state.” 160 But so much separation as to
“purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious” because
that, too, would “promote the kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeks
to avoid.” 161 The state must not “engage in nor compel,” nor do anything resulting
in excessive “interference with, or promotion of” religion. 162 It must maintain this
perfect equipoise not only among “sects,” but between “religion and nonreligion.” 163
Justice Breyer can conceive of no test that might tell us whether government has
strayed from the narrow path on which it must stay.164 I should think not.
This ambition puts us in a bind. Given the scope of the modern state and the
diversity of religious perspectives, requiring a true neutrality between those claiming
that they have been exposed to a message that causes them to feel disfavored on religious grounds would substantially restrict the state’s ability to speak and to enforce it
to withdraw from much of what it does. Not surprisingly, faced with an unenforceable mandate of neutrality, courts have abandoned it. If the endorsement of competing
beliefs or disapproval of the dissenter’s beliefs is expressed through secular speech or
selective omission, courts have refused to find a constitutional injury.
B. The Asymmetrical Treatment of “Secular” Speech
While we might loosely refer to speech that, while not expressly religious, contradicts or marginalizes certain religious beliefs as “secular speech” that is not quite
accurate or, if it is, the label is not pertinent. Speech that communicates to some that
156

See id. at 859 n.9.
The line between acknowledging that many have believed and that this belief has value
is rather imprecise.
158
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 699.
162
Id. at 698–99.
163
Id. at 698.
164
Id. at 699.
157

2009]

M UST G OD B E D EAD OR IRRELEVANT

25

their religious beliefs are wrong will not be perceived as secular, nor will calling it
such deprive it of religious significance.
1. Government Speech that Ignores Religious Perspectives
One frequent manifestation of asymmetry is in the exclusion or restriction of
religious perspectives or messages under circumstances in which some—or perhaps
even many—religious adherents believe them to be pertinent. This is the driving force
behind cases involving holiday displays, public monuments and voluntary prayer. The
idea is that there ought to be public acknowledgment of major and widely shared religious observations and of the perceived religious sources of law and human liberty.
Dedication of public events, it is argued, ought to take place in a way that many citizens
will find meaningful. To be told that there are certain ways in which this may not be
done can be, and is perceived as, a message of disapproval and marginalization.165
But it is more than that.
As I argued in an earlier piece, schools do much more than teach academic subjects unrelated to religious concerns.166 They routinely engage students about how
and what to think about issues such as sexuality, tolerance for the choices and lifestyles of others, diversity of races and cultures, and the environment.167 “Education,”
as Judge Stephen Reinhardt recently noted, “serves higher civic and social functions,
including the rearing of children into healthy, productive, and responsible adults and
the cultivation of talented and qualified leaders of diverse backgrounds.” 168
If, for example, a school encourages certain ways of moral decision-making or
making choices about sexual activity169 that may exclude, or minimize, 170 religious
165

Our annual Christmas wars, it seems to me, are more about the propriety of public
secularity than they are about decorations, music, and greetings.
166
See Esenberg, supra note 11, at 31–32.
167
This “clarification” of values may be mandatory as well as merely suggestive. It is not
unusual for a teacher certification program to require successful teaching candidates to exhibit a “commitment to social justice” and the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher
Education has expressly recognized this as a “disposition” that may be required for accreditation. See, e.g., Robert “K.C.” Johnson, Disposition For Bias, F OU ND ATION FOR I ND IVIDU AL
R IGH TS IN E D U CATIO N , May 23, 2005, available at http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/
6250.html. At W ashington State University, a student received negative values on “dispositions” requiring him to be “sensitive to community and cultural norms” and to “appreciat[e]
and valu[e] human diversity” allegedly because he was a self-described “conservative Christian”
who did not believe that male and white privilege exist. Press Release, Foundation for Individual
Rights in Education, Education Programs May Have a ‘Disposition’ for Censorship, (Sept. 21,
2005) available at http://www.thefire.org/indexphp/article/6280.html.
168
Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1209 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 447 F.3d
1187 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1089 (2006).
169
See Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1531 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 826 (1985) (objecting to a book in an English literature curriculum); Gheta v. Nassau
County Cmty. Coll., 33 F. Supp. 2d 179, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (challenging a sexuality course).
170
Even if the publicly expressed view is that religion is one of many more or less
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considerations. It is hardly a stretch to say that such instruction may reasonably be
perceived by believers as a message that these perspectives are less important—and
are certainly never to be urged upon others—even if no student complains that such
speech directly contradicts her religious values.
Even in the more traditionally “academic” realm, what schools say—or, again,
do not say—about the role of religion in the nation’s history and current affairs have
implications for students’ religious lives. As we have seen, throughout most of the
twentieth and now into the twenty-first century, bitter controversy surrounds the fact
and manner of teaching evolution and whether to include alternatives ranging from
“creation science” to “intelligent design.” 171 Even if, for example, teaching about evolution makes no claims about (the absence of) a theological purpose or the implications of scientific explanations for processes and phenomena once thought to be explicable only by invocation of the divine, students may nevertheless be indoctrinated into
a preference for materialism. Judge Michael McConnell has put it this way:
If the public school day and all its teaching is strictly secular, the
child is likely to learn the lesson that religion is irrelevant to the
significant things of this world, or at least the spiritual realm is
radically separate and distinct from the temporal. However unintended, these are lessons about religion. They are not “neutral.”
Studious silence on a subject that parents may say touches all of
life is an eloquent refutation.172
Although public education is the paradigmatic example of government speech,
it is not the only one. As the government has taken on greater responsibility for the
delivery of social services, what it communicates about, for example, how one escapes
poverty or recovers from addiction, assumes a larger role in the public’s assumptions and beliefs and about how such problems are to be addressed and what is to be
said about them. Religious social services agencies, such as Catholic Charities and
Lutheran Social Services, have long been accused of becoming increasingly secular
equivalent considerations or portrayed as something that “some people” believe which may
be further explored outside the formal educational process. If what is constitutionally significant
is the requirement that no one be made to feel like an outsider or to believe that the state disapproves of his or her faith, “establishment” in the sense of endorsement may arise. Those
who believe that duty to God is paramount will feel that duty has been slighted.
171
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 580–81 (1987) (creationism); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98 (1968) (evolution); Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ.,
185 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000) (creation science);
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (intelligent
design); Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 363–64 (Tenn. 1927) (evolution).
172
Michael W . McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 N W . U. L. R EV .
146, 162 (1986).
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as they grow more dependent on government funds.173 The exclusion—or state mandated 174 modification—of religious perspectives may well be perceived as a message
of disapproval.175
Public spaces, moreover, have always been places in which the state expresses the
values of the community. Plaques, public art and memorials purport to express and
reinforce the values of the community.176 If state-sponsored public acknowledgments
of various aspects of a community’s values and heritage must be secular, does the state
risk crowding out religious values and heritage by its failure to acknowledge them?
The point is not that the failure to include religious perspectives ought to be a constitutional violation, but that doctrine that prohibits, or significantly restricts, their
inclusion will not be neutral as between them and competing secular perspectives.
2. Government Speech that Contradicts Religious Principles
Governmental messages may expressly contradict the religious views of those
to whom they are directed. While government may not directly address religious doctrine “some of what schools do teach will imply that various religious perspectives
are untrue or unsound.” 177
For some, teaching evolution may contradict the belief that God created life and
calls into question the authority of a sacred text that, in their view, describes how He
created it.178 This is particularly true where evolution is taught in a way that makes
teleological claims that go beyond the observable facts of evolution and its mechanisms.179 Teaching students how to make their own decisions on moral questions
or the expression of their sexuality contradicts the notion that such matters require
submission to the will of God.
Instruction on the equality of men and women may contradict the view of certain
Muslims. Teaching the social and moral equivalence of same-sex relations may seem
173

See, e.g., Rev. Robert A. Sirico, Taking the “Catholic” out of Catholic Charities: He
Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune, P H ILAN THR O PY , Jan. 1, 1998, available at http://www
.philanthropyroundtable.org/printarticle.asp?article=1364.
174
Often the allegedly “secularizing” influence has been the prohibition of certain forms
of discrimination, such as on the basis of sexual orientation or religious belief, or mandates for
services, such as abortion or contraception, in a way that is claimed to be inconsistent with
a religious organization’s mission.
175
It may, in addition, “crowd out” religious providers as taxpayer-funded entities occupy
the field. See infra Part III.A.
176
See Brief for International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 5–6, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665)
(citing S ANFORD L EVINSON , W RITTEN IN S TONE : P UBLIC M ONUM ENTS IN C HANGING S OCIETIES
90 (1998)).
177
Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools, 18 J. L. & P O L. 329,
332 (2002).
178
See, e.g., Genesis.
179
See, e.g., R ICH ARD D AW K IN S , T H E G O D D ELU SIO N (2006).
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to conflict with the view of conservative Christians about human sexuality. That message, in and of itself, may interfere with “the preservation and transmission of religious
beliefs” that the Lee Court “insisted be committed to the private sphere.”180 That interference, moreover, may go beyond this particular subject. If believers regard these
views as explicitly set forth in the Q’uran 181 or the Bible,182 the state has communicated
the notion that these sacred texts, which they may claim to be infallible, are wrong.
3. The Absence of a Remedy
a. Secular Speech as Interference with Free Exercise
One approach taken by those who feel aggrieved by these messages has been to
argue that the communication of such messages—or at least the refusal to exempt nonadherents from having to receive them—is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
That approach has failed.
As noted earlier, the classic case is Mozert v. Hawkins County Board. of Education. 183 In Mozert, plaintiffs argued that certain required readings in the Hawkins
County, Tennessee school district were offensive to and contradicted their religious
beliefs.184 For that reason, requiring their children to be exposed to such material
constituted a violation of their free exercise rights. 185 A divided panel of the Sixth
Circuit found no free exercise violation because the students were required neither
to affirm nor to deny any particular point of view. 186 In the Court’s view, “[w]hat
[was] . . . absent . . . [was] the critical element of compulsion to affirm or deny a religious belief or to engage or refrain from engaging in a practice forbidden or required
in the exercise of plaintiff’s religion.” 187 Public schools have the right, the Court
noted, to teach fundamental values “‘essential to a democratic society’” including
180

Lee v. W eisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).
Q’uran, Book of Nissa, 6:34 (“M en are the protectors / And maintainers of women, /
Because Allah has given / The one more (strength) / Than the other, and because / They
support them / From their means. / Therefore the righteous women / [a]re devoutly obedient,
and guard / In (the husband’s) absence / W hat Allah would have them guard. / As to those
women / On whose part ye fear / disloyalty and ill-conduct, / Admonish them (first), / (Next),
refuse to share their beds, / (And last) beat them (lightly); / But if they return to obedience,
/ Seek not against them / Means (of annoyance): / For Allah is Most High, Great (above you
all).”) (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., Sh. Muhammad Ashraf 1969).
182
Leviticus 18:22 (“You must not lie with a man, as with a woman: that is an
abomination.”).
183
827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
184
Id. at 1060–61.
185
Id. at 1061. The Mozert plaintiffs chose not to advance an Establishment Clause claim.
They sought to be exempted from the offending curriculum, not to change it. Id. at 1069.
186
Id. at 1069.
187
Id.
181
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“‘tolerance of divergent political and religious views.’” 188 This (and other aspects)
of the Mozert holding have been roundly criticized, not least of all for the Court’s failure to recognize that exposure to, and the admonition to tolerate, certain “divergent”
views were precisely what the plaintiffs argued was inconsistent with the exercise
of their religion.189
Most recently in Parker v. Hurley,190 the First Circuit rejected a Mozert-type
challenge brought by parents who objected to the use in kindergarten and first grade
classes of books depicting families in which both parents were of the same gender and
the in-class reading of a book that depicted and celebrated a gay marriage. 191 As in
Mozert, the plaintiffs did not seek to ban the books from the school curriculum, but
to be provided with notice of such materials and the opportunity to be exempted.192
They argued that the classroom instruction interfered with their ability to inculcate
their religious beliefs and that the children were “‘essentially’” required “‘to affirm
a belief inconsistent with and prohibited by their religion.’” 193
The court rejected both free exercise and establishment complaints.194 Under the
Supreme Court’s current free exercise paradigm, announced in Oregon v. Smith,195
the plaintiffs would have little prospect of success. Under Smith, the Free Exercise
Clause does not exempt persons from complying with neutral laws of general applicability.196 Courts and commentators have differed as to what extent Smith’s rejection
of the need for heightened scrutiny of the state’s regulatory interest should be balanced
against the plaintiff’s interest in being free of interference in “hybrid” cases 197—that
is, those cases in which a free exercise claim combined with another constitutional
objection. 198 But the Parker court found that the challenged curriculum violated
neither the plaintiff’s free exercise rights nor the due process right of parents to control
the education of their children.199 It rejected the plaintiff’s free exercise claim because
188

Id. at 1068 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).
Stolzenberg, supra note 29, at 605–06 (“After all, requiring impressionable children
to exhibit adherence to beliefs they do not (yet) hold is an effective way of cultivating adherence to those beliefs.”).
190
Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 56 (2008).
191
Id. at 90, 92–93.
192
Id. at 90.
193
Id. at 94 (quoting the Complaint filed by plaintiffs).
194
Id. at 101–07.
195
494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
196
Id. at 879; accord, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531 (1993).
197
Compare Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion and Public Schools:
The Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious Upbringing of Children, 103 M ICH . L.
R EV . 2209, 2220–21 (2005), with Michael W . McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. C H I. L. R EV . 1109, 1121–22 (1990).
198
Parker, 514 F.3d at 98–99. As for the due process rights, see, for example, Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
199
Parker, 514 F.3d at 101–07.
189
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it lacked an allegation of coercion and declined to recognize a free exercise right to
be free of indoctrination.
Public schools are not obliged to shield individual students from
ideas which potentially are religiously offensive, particularly
when the school imposes no requirement that the student agree
with or affirm those ideas, or even participate in discussions about
them. . . . The reading of King and King was not instruction in
religion or religious beliefs.200
With respect to the due process claim, the court distinguished Wisconsin v. Yoder,
holding that the state may not require Amish families to send their children to school
past the eighth grade as involving a greater degree of compulsion.201 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs, objecting to the curricular materials, were not seeking to
preserve a largely separate exposure and faced no sanctions for withdrawal.202 They
could simply choose to send their children to private schools.203
The results are not surprising within the four corners of free exercise doctrine.
Quite apart from whether the challenged practices constitute neutral laws of general
applicability, the Court has generally required that a dissenter be coerced into violating
her religious beliefs or that a state measure penalize religious activity by denying her
“an equal share of the rights, benefits and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”204 No
free exercise case has required that government be required to speak and act in a
manner acceptable to a litigant’s religious beliefs.
b. Secular Speech as Establishment
But government’s ability to speak and to act has been found to be restricted by the
Establishment Clause and, in the post-Everson era, the absence of coercion or penalty
200

Id. at 106 (citing Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir.
1994); Mozert v. Hawkins County B d. Of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1063-65, 1070 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied , 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)); see also Bauchman v. W . High Sch., 132 F.3d
542, 558 (10th Cir., 1997) (“[P]ublic schools are not required to delete from the curriculum
all materials that may offend any religious sensibility.”); cf. W . Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (distinguishing between compelling students to declare a belief
through mandatory recital of the pledge of allegiance, which violates free exercise, and
“merely . . . acquaint[ing students] with the flag salute so that they may be informed as to
what it is or even what it means”) (citations omitted).
201
Parker, 514 F.3d at 99–100, 105 (“The parents allege neither coercion in the form of
a direct interference with their religious beliefs, nor compulsion in the form of punishment
for their beliefs, as in Yoder.”); see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210–12.
202
Parker, 514 F.3d at 99–100.
203
Id. at 102.
204
See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
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has been largely irrelevant. In virtually no modern Establishment Clause case, certainly not in Engel, Edwards, Abington, Wallace, Lee, Santa Fe, or McCreary, was
anyone compelled to affirm anything.
Nevertheless, the claim that pervasive secularism violates the Establishment
Clause has also failed. In Board of School Commissioners v. Smith, 205 the trial court
held that certain textbooks used in Alabama elementary and secondary schools violated
the Establishment Clause because they advanced the religion of secular humanism
and inhibited theistic religion.206 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed.207 In its view, the texts conveyed a message of “independent thought, tolerance
of diverse views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance, and logical decision-making,”
and this was an “entirely appropriate secular effect.” 208 The absence of a discussion of
religion, it concluded, did not convey a message of approval of secular humanism.209
Other cases considering allegations of an “establishment” of secularism have generally
reached similar conclusions.210
Even where government has arguably directly denounced a religious tradition or
group, plaintiffs have struggled. An illustrative example is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in American Family Association v. San Francisco.211 Certain conservative
Christian organizations ran a newspaper advertisement proclaiming that, while
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Christians love homosexuals, “God abhors any form of sexual sin,” including
“homosexuality, premarital sex or adultery.” 212 The ad stated:
For years, Christians have taken a stand in the public square against
aggressive homosexual activism. We’ve paid a heavy price, with
sound-bite labels like “bigot” and “homophobe.” But all along
we’ve had a hand extended, something largely unreported in the
media . . . an open hand that offers healing for homosexuals, not
harassment. We want reason in this debate, not rhetoric. And
we want to share the hope we have in Christ, for those who feel
acceptance of homosexuality is their only hope.213
In response, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors sent a letter to the groups
condemning the acts as “hateful rhetoric,” and claiming a direct correlation between
their message and crimes against gays and lesbians.214 The Board passed a resolution
condemning the murder of a gay man in Alabama and calling “for the Religious Right
to take accountability for the impact of their long-standing rhetoric denouncing gays
and lesbians, which leads to a climate of mistrust and discrimination that can open the
door to horrible crimes.” 215
The Board also passed a resolution naming one of the plaintiff Christian organizations and suggesting that ads encouraging gays and lesbians to change their sexual
orientation “are erroneous and full of lies.”216 This resolution said that ads suggesting
that “gays and lesbians are ‘immoral and undesirable create an atmosphere which
validates oppression of gays and lesbians’ and encourages maltreatment of them.” 217
Additionally, the Board passed a resolution calling upon local television stations to
boycott the ads.218
Applying the Lemon test, the Ninth Circuit noted that “although the letter and
resolutions may appear to contain attacks on the Plaintiffs’ religious views, in particular that homosexuality is sinful, there is also a plausible secular purpose in the
defendants’ actions—protecting gays and lesbians from violence.”219 Although noting
that there is little guidance in determining whether a government action has the primary purpose of inhibiting religion, the majority concluded that while “the letter and
resolution may contain over-generalizations about the Religious Right, at times misconstrue the Plaintiffs’ message, and may be based on a tenuous perceived connection
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
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between the Plaintiffs’ advertisements and the increase in violence against gays and
lesbians,” none of this “make[s] religious hostility the primary effect of the Defendants’
actions.” 220 Although conceding that the letter and resolution might create division
along religious lines, it concluded that political divisiveness alone cannot create an
Establishment Clause violation,221 or else “government bodies would be at risk any
time they took an action that affected potentially religious issues, including abortion,
alcohol use, other sexual issues, etc.” 222 The majority also rejected the plaintiffs’ Free
Exercise claim, concluding (without mentioning the call for a boycott) that no religious conduct was affected by the defendants’ conduct.223
Judge Noonan dissented. Writing that “[t]o assert that a group’s religious message and religious categorization of conduct are responsible for murder is to attack
the group’s religion,” and that it is “difficult to think of a more direct attack.” 224 He
concluded:
The city is saved as to its purpose by its plausible purpose of seeking to reduce violence against gays and lesbians; but this plausible
purpose does not neutralize the effect of the means chosen by the
city—a means that achieves its effect by its assertion of a direct
correlation between the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and the killing
of human beings. It is difficult to believe that any informed and
reasonable observer could think that the primary effect of the city’s
message was, “Don’t incite violence against gays and lesbians.”
The city, well aware of the plaintiffs’ advertising campaign proclaiming their love for homosexuals, knew that such a conventional admonition would have been brushed off as a bromide with
an “Of course not.” To reach the plaintiffs, to strike at what the
city perceived as a danger, the city had to strike at the heart of the
plaintiffs’ religious belief, to focus on their belief that the conduct
they were trying to change was an offense to God and to make
that belief responsible for murder. 225
“Suppose a city council,” Judge Noonan observed ,“. . . adopted a resolution
condemning Islam because its teachings embraced the concept of a holy war and so,
the resolution said, were ‘directly correlated’ with the bombing of the World Trade
Center.” 226 While a purpose of the resolution might be to discourage bombings,
220
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Judge Noonan asked (rhetorically) if “any reasonable, informed observer [would]
doubt that the primary effect of such an action by a city could be the expression of
official hostility to the religion practiced by a billion people?” 227
In Harper v. Poway Unified School District, 228 a student, in response to a school
sponsored “Day of Silence” promoting tolerance for gays and lesbians, wore a homemade T-shirt expressing his disapproval of homosexuality on religious grounds.229
The shirt read “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD CONDEMNED” handwritten on the front and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL”
written on the back.230 Although the district court denied his motion for a preliminary
injunction, he was found to have stated establishment and free exercise claims at least
in part because school officials had told him to “leave his faith ‘in his car,’” and that
Christianity was “not based on hate” and, therefore, he should not offend others.231
On appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary
injunction on free speech grounds, emphasizing the “disruptive nature” of Harper’s
speech and finding that schools may restrict speech that “attacks high school students
who are members of minority groups that have historically been oppressed, subjected
to verbal and physical abuse, and made to feel inferior, serves to injure and intimidate
them, as well as to damage their sense of security and interfere with their opportunity
to learn.” 232 The majority held that Harper had not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on his Free Exercise or Establishment Clause claims.233
With respect to Harper’s free exercise claim, the majority found that there was
no substantial burden on his religious practice because he was not compelled to affirm
a repugnant belief. 234 He was not penalized or discriminated against because of his
religious views, or was the availability of a benefit conditioned on violation of a tenet
of his faith.235 It noted the school’s interest in prohibiting disruption of the educational process or “physical and psychological injury to young people entrusted to
their care.” 236
In response to Harper’s allegation that school officials tried to change his beliefs
or told him that his interpretation of Christianity was wrong, the majority characterized the challenged behavior as an attempt to change his inflammatory conduct and
227
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that, in any event, “school officials’ statements and any other school activity intended
to teach Harper the virtues of tolerance constitute a proper exercise of a school’s educational function, even if the message conflicts with the views of a particular religion.”237
The majority also rejected Harper’s Establishment Clause claim. It suggested
that nonestablishment, as opposed to free exercise, is more properly concerned with
government measures that advance religion and concluded that the school had a
secular purpose in teaching “secular democratic values” that neither advanced nor
inhibited religion.238
Judge Kozinski dissented on free speech grounds. He did not believe that the
record supported the claim that the t-shirt would cause substantial disruption or invade
the rights of others.239 Having introduced the topic of homosexuality, the school could
not, in his view, engage in viewpoint discrimination even to protect minorities.240
He also thought Harper was likely to prevail on a claim that the school’s harassment
policy was overly broad.241
Condemnation of a religious group by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors
was once again at issue in Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City and
County of San Francisco.242 In March 2006, Cardinal W illiam Joseph Levada, the
head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, directed the Archdiocese of
San Francisco to stop placing children in need with homosexual couples.243 In response, the Board passed a resolution that expressed outrage that “a foreign country,
like the Vatican, meddles with” the city’s “existing and established customs.”244 It said
that his decree was “absolutely unacceptable to the citizenry of San Francisco.” 245 It
called Cardinal Levada’s directive “hateful and discriminatory rhetoric [that] is both
insulting and callous, and shows a level of insensitivity and ignorance . . . seldom
encountered” by the Board.246 Referring to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith as the former “Holy Office of the Inquisition,” the resolution called on Cardinal
Levada to withdraw his doctrine and for the San Francisco Archdiocese to defy it.247
The District Court had little trouble rejecting a challenge to the resolution.248 Although
the state “may be perceived as pejorative,” the court found it clear from the text of the
statute that any “criticism” was presented “in the context of same-sex adoption—a
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secular dimension of the City’s culture and tradition,” 249 it saw the call upon the
archdiocese to defy the order as a secular attempt to promote same-sex adoption and
non-discrimination “rather than meddling with internal church affairs.” 250 “Elected
officials,” it concluded, “are certainly free to express their electorates’ views.” 251
III. T HE P ROBLEM OF A SYMMETRY
Much, then, seems to turn on whether a government message uses expressly
theological propositions. Perhaps one could argue that the insult is somehow less
fundamental if it avoids direct comment on what are thought to be core religious principles, such as whether there is a God, Jesus is the Messiah, and the Q’uran is the word
of God. In this view, the insult is simply a product of living in a society in which not
everyone shares the same religious beliefs and no sectarian group is entitled to have
the temporal implications of its faith made into public policy. Whatever insult results
from, say, the teaching of evolution or the acceptance of gays and lesbians, is simply
the inevitable consequence of democratic give and take in a pluralistic society.
A. Asymmetry Does Not Satisfy Substantive or Endorsement Neutrality
Some commentators have endorsed this, arguing that establishment of “nonreligion” would require the express advocacy of an agnostic or atheistic position.252
To quote one commentator, as long as the schools have not taught “that there is no
God,” the fact that they have taught values and methods of reaching them incompatible
with some students’ religious view is unproblematic.253 Several lower courts, faced
with an argument that the exclusion of expressions of faith from public life constitutes
an establishment of secularism, stated the need for some active advocacy, as opposed
to the mere assumption, of irreligion.254 In an attempt to justify such an approach,
Steven Shiffrin argues that while there may be no distinction between these assertions
as a matter of “logical entailment,” there is as a matter of “social meaning.” 255
In this view, the disfavored position of religious dissenters who claim harm from
public secularity is the price we pay for religious freedom. Secularity is the common
ground that must be accepted in order to avoid, as Kathleen Sullivan put it, the war
of “all against all” and domination of the majority.256
249
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The argument is that religion is foundational in a way that other beliefs are not.
Because it addresses matters of ultimate concern, religion’s claim on adherents is
uniquely strong and tantamount to an immutable characteristic like race and gender.
Thus, religion is commonly a prohibited basis for discrimination.257 Because of this,
the argument continues, individuals are uniquely sensitive to messages that are contrary
to their beliefs about religion, including beliefs regarding the uncertainty or nonexistence of God. Even if disputes about religion do not actually result in greater division
than those about politics, religious insults are alienating in a way that others are not.258
When the government takes a position on religious matters that is contrary to that of
its citizens, nonadherents are more likely to perceive it as an attack on their identity and
take it as a message that they are disfavored members of the political community.
Of course, there is no constitutional injunction against division as such and much
of our constitutional jurisprudence holds that a multiplicity of views and a marketplace
of ideas are good things. In fact, James Madison famously believed that the answer to
factionalism was to permit each faction full access to the public square.259 As Professor
Gerald Bradley has noted, perhaps the Court, on matters of religion, has abandoned
Madison’s vision of “manageable conflict” and turned instead to the “privatization”
of faith.260
But the larger problem is that it does not work and the notion that faith ought to
be “privatized” is anything but substantively neutral. To borrow from Richard Garnett,
limiting the “nonendorsement” principle to the expressly religious “depends on the
possibility of identifying such matters and distinguishing them meaningfully from
other ‘matters’ about which people deeply disagree.” 261 He notes that “[f]or many
257
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religious people, much or even all that they do—whether or not it is done in the context of prayer, liturgy, or ritual—is ‘religious.’”262 If this is the case, then a line drawn
that prohibits explicitly religious assertions but permits secular assertions without
regard to how they may contradict the religious beliefs of those who hear them is unlikely to avoid division. The extant evidence—continued litigation and complaints of
a secular public square—suggests that it does not.
One can imagine two expressive harms or impacts from government messages
concerning religion. The first is that it may express impermissible attitudes toward
persons or groups.263 Nonestablishment, at least as conceived in the post-Everson era,
is concerned not only with political equality, but also with social equality—at least
as far as the government is concerned. Nonendorsement, then, serves an important
expressivist purpose, namely, to make clear that religion is not a marker of political
status or a basis for exclusion. It is a statement about equality, tolerance, and inclusion. As Dean Chemerinsky puts it, everyone is entitled to assume that the government is “theirs;”264 or if it is not, that the basis for alienation is not religious. The
second is that it forms and shapes them—that is, it expresses and inculcates social
values and norms.265
In each of these cases discussing “secular” messages, government speech was
nevertheless claimed to communicate something about citizens’ religious beliefs.
Although nonadherents were not coerced or asked to affirm offending beliefs, this
would not, as we have seen, excuse messages perceived to endorse religion. The
absence of coercion has never, or at least not recently, been a required element of an
Establishment Clause claim. Although the government’s messages were not explicitly religious in the sense of using theological language or making assertions about
extratemporal matters, to argue that there is a meaningful distinction between advocacy for a set of ideas that are completely inconsistent with a proposition and express
denial of the proposition is to insult the intelligence of the hearer. 266
As the Mozert line of cases—and our hypothetical Dick and Jane—illustrate, the
exclusion or limitation of religious perspectives when they are, in the view of many,
pertinent or the communication of messages contrary to certain citizens’ strongly held
religious beliefs does convey religious insult. If we are concerned with the messages
that objective observers will draw from this, it is that religious beliefs—or their temporal implications—are either not appropriate for public discourse or that they are
262
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inherently subjective and are more or less incomprehensible outside of the community
of believers. That they cannot—and perhaps even ought not—be asserted outside the
community of adherents. Thus, those in the position of Chase Harper are told to keep
their religion in their car.267
The idea that such ostensibly secular messages convey religious insult and interfere
with religious formation is buttressed by recent—and widely accepted—scholarship
on the nature of religious formation. Sociologists of religion and theologians have
increasingly turned away from an individualized or “private” view of religion in which
one’s search for meaning is private and taken fundamentally. As Professor Kathleen
Brady has pointed out, “modern” theology was rooted in Kant’s argument that one cannot know a thing in itself (“noumena”), including God, but only the “phenomenon”
of experience, and in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s subsequent adoption of that idea to
theology.268 For Schleiermacher, religion becomes far more subjective, a feeling of
“absolute dependence.” 269 For those writing in this modern tradition, human beings
are innately religious—that is, we have common intuitions or feelings that point to, in
the words of Paul Tillich, “the ground of our being.” 270 Although we may well feel
compelled to express or reinforce religious experiences and emotions in community,
“human nature begins with a divine orientation which will inevitably express itself
in communal forms without external prodding or support.” 271
What Brady refers to as the “postliberal” challenge to modern theology argue
that religions resemble languages or cultures, and that “people do not become religious
by tapping into a religious dimension that exists as a pre-reflective or pre-thematic
experience in the depths of self,” but “by being ‘socialized’ into a religious community
and by ‘interioriz[ing]’ a set of skills by practice and training.’” 272 Other scholars
writing in this tradition have argued that, in addition to being formed in community,
religion is porous and “permeable”—that is, religious communities interact with the
larger culture 273 and, thus, will “always share[] cultural forms with its wider host culture and other religions.”274 In other words, they are influenced by what occurs during
the rest of the week and outside the doors of houses of worships and homes. Brady
writes, “for postliberals, humans all ‘stand within traditions,’ and truth is something
267
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which can be attained only in and through particular religious communities.” 275
People do not rely on reason to reach religion as Jefferson envisioned, nor do they find
it deep within the self or as the result of a direct revelation from God to the individual.
Rather, they learn it, and thus, it is only in the context of particular religious communities that it makes sense to talk about religious truth.276
If this is so, then the expansion of government in daily life will magnify the influence of what the government says and there is no reason to believe that its impact
on religious choice and upon the political standing of adherents will turn on the use
of expressly theological language or the assertion of metaphysical claims.
Our Establishment Clause jurisprudence assumes that the voice of government
carries great weight and that its endorsement of a religious position may place great
pressure on religious dissenters to conform. It may have a disproportionate influence
and “crowd out” religious perspectives that are inconsistent with the state’s message.
There is little reason to believe that this pressure and influence is avoided by messages
that, while avoiding theological language, are just as inconsistent with theological
presuppositions as explicitly theological claims.
To believe otherwise is to choose to assume one particular interpretive choice as
a matter of law. We have, again, constructed the “reasonable observer” of our choice.
It seems evident that real world dissidents do not ascribe to Professor Shiffrin’s social
meaning and that to tell our hypothetical Jane to choose one meaning over another is
tantamount to telling her to, in Dean Garvey’s words, “cover your ears!”277 Although
that may be a perfectly reasonable bit of advice, it is not the way we treat even the
most bland religious expressions. We may well need to modify doctrine in a way that
tells dissenters, under certain circumstances, to cover their ears. In fact, I believe that
we do. But if there is a justification for treating offending messages differently based
upon their use—or non-use—of express religious language, it is not because one form
of speech impacts dissenters differently than the other.
The distinction between express religious expression and the communication of
messages that might be understood to convey an implied religious message, moreover,
has not generally been thought to resolve establishment concerns.
The Court has long recognized the potential for endorsement of a religious proposition by secular language. In Epperson v. Arkansas, the mere exclusion of secular
messages, where thought to be religiously motivated, was found to constitute an establishment.278 In Edwards v. Aguillard, as we have seen, the Supreme Court struck down
a law requiring that creation science be taught in public school whenever evolution
was taught. 279 Although the law defined creation science as “the scientific evidences
275
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for [creation or evolution] and inferences from those scientific evidences,”280 the Court
found that the law’s “purpose” was to advance religion (as it certainly was) and, therefore, the law violated the Establishment Clause.281 It emphasized the right of families
to “entrust public schools with the education of their children” with the assurance that
those schools would not “advance religious views that may conflict with the private
beliefs of the student and his or her family.” 282 But that interest is precisely what
prompts parental objections to the teaching of evolution or to the exclusion of alternative views of the origins of life.
As I have noted in a previous article, the difficulty is
not finessed by reference to the well-known rule that government
is not barred from communicating a particular message simply because it is consistent or inconsistent with the tenets of a religion.
The problem is not simply that government has taken a position
that happens to run afoul of a tenet of someone’s religion or is
simply consistent with an atheistic or agnostic world view but that
it has systematically, whether by constitutional fiat, fear of litigation, or a secularist bent, ruled out—or restricted— religion as an
approach to whatever information is being imparted or service
being provided, effectively denying its relevance. The exclusion
is neither happenstance nor partial.283
To argue, as does Andrew Koppelman, that government may establish all orthodoxies
but religious ones, is to say something about religion.284
B. Asymmetry and Mediating Institutions
Even if asymmetry cannot be justified in terms of individual liberty, or of substantive neutrality toward the religious choices of its citizens, perhaps it can be seen as a
form of jurisdictional limit, as a means of protecting the institutional prerogatives of
churches, mosques, synagogues and other voluntary religious associations. In other
words, as many have argued, asymmetry protects churches by keeping the eighthundred pound gorilla of the state from involving itself with theological matters.
Such a view is suggested by recent scholarly emphasis on First Amendment institutions and the religion clauses as a demarcation of jurisdiction between church and
280
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state. 285 This view certainly seems consistent with much of what we have from
Madison and other founding era proponents of religious liberty and disestablishment
who emphasized the superior demands of God and a conscience which, for them, was
most likely to be based in religious faith. It is also consistent with the view, expressed
by Roger Williams and others, that the “wilderness” of the state corrupts the “garden”
of true religion.286
There are a number of theories concerned with the role of voluntary associations
as mediating institutions— that is, as sources of values and social capital that, while
perhaps complementary with the state, are independent of it. We may consider the idea
of subsidiarity—the notion, most commonly associated with Catholic social thought,287
that a community of the “higher order” ought to interfere as little as possible with those
of a lower order.288 Tocqueville wrote of the value of “associationalism” in sustaining American democracy. A similar, but not quite identical idea, is rooted in Dutch
theologian and politician Abraham Kuyper’s notion of sphere sovereignty. 289
Although the Establishment Clause cannot be said to have “enacted” or even to
have been informed by notions such as sphere sovereignty or subsidiarity (neither of
which existed in present form at the time it was written), some scholars have suggested
that they have antecedents that may well have influenced American thinking.290 In any
event, the notion of the independence of the Church and religious formation conscience
from the state can be found in the historical record and the idea may be a useful lens
through which to view Establishment Clause asymmetry, but not, as we will see, to
reconcile it. Even if we move from an individual to an institutional view and from an
emphasis upon lack of state interference to facilitation of the proper roles of separate
spheres, asymmetry remains problematic.
1. Subsidiarity
Often traced to Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum, subsidiarity
emphasizes the existence of independent institutions with an autonomy that is not
subject to state control or interference. Leo emphasized the family:
285
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reprinted in P ERRY M ILLER , R OGER W ILLIA M S : H IS C O N TRIBU TIO N TO TH E A M ERICAN
T RAD ITIO N 98 (1953).
287
See Pope John Paul II, C ENTESIM U S A N N U S ¶ 48 (1991).
288
Id.; see Richard S. M yers, Reflections on the Teaching of Civic Virtue in the Public
Schools, 74 U. D ET . M ERCY L. R EV . 63, 89 (1996).
289
See infra Part III. B. 3.
290
Kyle Duncan, Subsidiarity and Religious Establishments in the United States
Constitution, 52 V ILL. L. R EV . 67, 110–113 (2007); Horwitz, supra note 285, at 106–15.

2009]

M UST G OD B E D EAD OR IRRELEVANT

43

Provided,for
therefore,
limits
which
are prescribed
by thehas
very
purposes
which itthe
exists
be not
transgressed,
the family
at
least equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of the
things needful to its preservation and its just liberty. We say, “at
least equal rights;” for, inasmuch as the domestic household is
antecedent, as well in idea as in fact, to the gathering of men into
a community, the family must necessarily have rights and duties
which are prior to those of the community, and founded more
immediately in nature. If the citizens, if the families on entering
into association and fellowship, were to experience hindrance in
a commonwealth instead of help, and were to find their rights
attacked instead of being upheld, society would rightly be an
object of detestation rather than of desire. The contention, then,
that the civil government should at its option intrude into and
exercise intimate control over the family and the household is a
great and pernicious error.291
Forty years later, in his 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, Pope Pius XI cautioned that “it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of
right order, to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate
organizations can do.”292 Much later, Pope John XXIII argued that “the founding of
a great many . . . intermediate groups or societies for the pursuit of aims which it is not
within the competence of the individual to achieve efficiently, is a matter of great
urgency.” 293 In Gaudium et Spes, Pope Paul VI emphasized that “[r]ulers must be
careful not to hamper the development of family, social or cultural groups, nor that of
intermediate bodies or organizations, and not to deprive them of opportunities for legitimate and constructive activity; they should willingly seek rather to promote the orderly
pursuit of such activity.” 294 In their respective spheres, he argued, “[t]he Church and
the political community in their own fields are autonomous and independent from
each other.” 295 Thus, the realm of the Church ought to be free of state interference.
Subsidiarity is not a Madisonian notion, seeing the respective realms of society—
the state, churches, universities, business—as checks and balances upon each other;296
but rather sees society as “a complex web of family, social, religious, and governmental
ties with the ultimate goal of encouraging and empowering the individual exercise of
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responsibility.” 297 It has aspects of positive, as well as negative liberty. 298 It is not
simply a doctrine mandating restraints upon power and is not “adequately represented
as a question of scale (lowest possible level), and even less of devolution” of power
from the state to “lesser” institutions.299 As Robert Vischer has written, “the government has an obligation to ensure the efficacy of mediating structures . . . .” 300
Sometimes, he stated, subsidiarity requires the government to intervene although it
may not “eviscerat[e] the real limitations on such intervention.301 Thus, in Dignitatis
Humanae, the Second Vatican Council, while insisting upon the independent spheres
of the Church and state, and that one may not direct the activity of the other, teaches
that the state must recognize and promote the religious life of its citizens.302
In the same way, the church may interact with and influence larger society, but
not by the exercise of its authority or by participation in the exercise of civil power.
Rather, it is the community of believers (in Catholic terms, the laity) whose role it is
“to see that the divine law is inscribed in the life of the earthly city.”303 In sum, subsidiarity’s “guiding principle is that intervention should ‘assist but not usurp’ mediating
structures.” 304 This implies both limits and obligations on the various social spheres.
2. Associationalism
Writing on the Rehnquist Court, John McGinnis has summarized its jurisprudence
as Tocquevillian:305
Tocqueville believed that while political factions try to use government coercion for their own ends, civil associations organize
297
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to meet the common goals of their members. Civil associations
promote reciprocity among their members and create social norms
from which other individuals can voluntarily choose. In this way
they generate what modern sociologists would call social capital:
the glue that binds society together through a group of interlocking networks.306
For Tocqueville, the “vibrancy, innovation, and beneficence of American society
did not come from its rulers but bubbled up from below.” 307 Religion was essential
to the vibrancy of American democracy, and was separated politically from the state
not to protect “secular people” but to prevent it “from being corrupted into something
less than itself.” 308 Although there is obviously much more to be said about this, the
idea is again one, not only of jurisdictional division, but of complementarity.
In fact, Professor McGinnis argues that the Rehnquist Court sought to rediscover
and empower decentralizing structures, including religious associations.309 This objective, in his view, suggests greater leeway for government to provide equal funding
opportunities for private schooling, including sectarian schools.310
Drawing on the insights of public choice theory regarding the distortion of democratic decision-making by special interests,311 Professor McGinnis argues that the
Rehnquist Court can be seen as encouraging the development of mediating institutions as “discovery machines” for the generation of potentially beneficial values and
norms in a jurisprudence of “spontaneous order.” 312
Significantly, for our purposes, Professor McGinnis cites Michael McConnell’s
observation that “‘as long as the domain of collective decision making is small, religious freedom is protected . . . as a byproduct of a limited state. As the domain of
government increases in scope, some government involvement in religious activity
becomes necessary if religious exercise is to be possible at all.’”313 In other words, a
change in the role—and size—of the state may influence its proper relationship with
subsidiary institutions. Thus, once again, the state is seen as having the freedom, if not
the constitutional duty, to act in a way that empowers mediating structures. In such a
world, literal reliance on Madison’s insistence that “not three pence” go to the support
306
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of religion,” 314 may be an anachronism. Given, for example, the taxation for public
education, as long as it acts on a neutral basis, “the state is empowered to help create
an infrastructure that enables associations organized for an educational purpose.” 315
3. Sphere Sovereignty
Echoing the Catholic notion of subsidiarity, Abraham Kuyper, writing in the
Calvinist tradition, believed that
[T]he family, the business, science, art and so forth are all social
spheres, which do not derive the law of their life from the superiority of the state, but obey a high authority within their own
bosom; an authority which rules by the “grace of God,” just as
the sovereignty of the State does. 316
For Kuyper, the state, although bound by God’s ordinance (as, in his view, was the entire creation), was not so compelled directly or “even by the proclamation of any church
but only via the consciences of persons in positions of authority.” 317 At the same
time, “[t]he State may never become an octopus, which stifles the whole of life.” 318
Once again, however, the image is organic. The state, he wrote, “must occupy
its own place, on its own root, among all the other trees of the forest, and thus it has
to honor and maintain every form of life which grows independently in its own sacred
autonomy.”319 It should be noted, moreover, that Kuyper did not see the state’s sphere
as including the promotion of a public secularity:
All [the gospel] asks is unlimited freedom to develop in accordance with its own genius in the heart of our national life. We do
not want the government to hand over unbelief handcuffed and
chained as though for a spiritual execution. We prefer that the
power of the gospel overcome that demon in free combat with
comparable weapons. Only this we do not want: that the government arm unbelief to force us, half-armed and handicapped by
an assortment of laws, into an unequal struggle with so powerful
an enemy. Yet that has happened and is happening still. It happens in all areas of popular education, on the higher as well as the
314
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lower levels, by means of the power of money, forced examinations, and official hierarchy. For this reason we may never desist
from our protest or resistance until the gospel recover its freedom
to circulate, until the performance of his Christian duty will again
be possible for every Dutch citizen, whether rich or poor.320
C. Government Speech as Interference with Mediating Institutions
Paul Horowitz, drawing upon Kuyper’s notion of sphere sovereignty, divides, as
I have here, Establishment Clause concerns into two categories: “[T]hose involving
equal funding and equal access to the public square for religious institutions, and those
involving . . . ‘symbolic support’ for religious institutions.”321 He argues that, as long
as other sovereign spheres are entitled to funding or to access to public facilities,
“churches should be in a similar position, provided that government does not interfere too much in their internal operations.” 322 On the other hand, “‘[t]he sovereignty
of the State and the sovereignty of the Church’ are mutually limiting, and that both are
harmed if they intertwine.” 323 Religious institutions “‘mark the limits of state jurisdiction by addressing spiritual matters that lie beyond the temporal concerns of government.’”324 Therefore, Professor Horwitz concludes, government “has no business
weighing in on religious questions or endorsing particular religious messages.” 325
Similarly, Professor McGinnis, in his discussion of associationalism, distinguishes
funding and forum cases from those involving government speech. Defending Lee
and Santa Fe, he argues that “government can facilitate competition between norms
by providing resources that are neutral among them, but it cannot itself enter the arena
on the side of one set of religious norms or another.”326 Religious messages, therefore,
remain outside the province of the state.
These are reasonable arguments—well stated and tightly made. But, as Professor
Horwitz recognizes,327 there is another side to the story. Respect for the separate
spheres of the state and the church is likely to work only if there is at least rough
agreement on the contours of those spheres and a commitment on the part of each not
to intrude upon what is reserved to the other. If religion is relegated to private life
it cannot “be expected to serve as a buffer, to mediate between persons and the state,
320
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or to compete with the liberal state for our values and loyalties.”328 If, at the same time,
the state intrudes upon the role of the church or seeks to influence matters with which
religion is concerned, it will, as Kuyper charged, “arm unbelief” in a way that does not
promote liberty, substantive neutrality or the vibrancy of religious associations.329
Kuyper himself grappled with this during the Dutch school controversy of the late
nineteenth century—an issue that was critical in his rise to political prominence and
the establishment of his Anti-Revolutionary Party. Although the revised Dutch educational law called for the inculcation of “Christian and civic virtues,” the education had
in the Kuyper’s, and many views, lost its distinctly Christian character.330 In light of
this, Kuyper believed that the requirement should be removed from the constitution
and the “neutrality” or secularity of Dutch schools be acknowledged.331
But, this does not mean that he believed secular public education was within the
proper sphere of the state. To the contrary, he urged the Christian School Society to
establish as its goal to be the wholesale destruction of state-controlled education in
favor of parentally guided education.332 In 1878, when the Prime Minister proposed
a series of educational reforms that would be funded only in state schools, Kuyper,
in conjunction with Catholic leaders, organized opposition.333
The notions of subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty define not only the realms
of mediating structures, but of the state itself. To borrow from Professor McGinnis,
expansion of the domain of collective decision-making applies to what the government
says as well as to what it finances.334 If this expansion involves the state with matters
with which alternative spheres are properly concerned, then the state has, in fact,
“enter[ed] the arena on the side of one set of religious norms or another.” 335 It has,
in Professor Horwitz’s terms “weigh[ed] in” on religious questions.336
As we have seen, that the state “weigh[s] in” without the use of theological language or by avoiding solely extratemporal subject matter does not make it otherwise.
It neither softens the message of disapproval or can be expected to have no impact on
“private” religious formation. Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, a prominent Kuyper scholar,
explained the harm that Kuyper saw in rigorously secularized education.
328
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[I]n Kuyper’sa certain
understanding,
a religion,That
whatever
else itwill
may
be,
incorporates
Weltanschauung.
worldview
come
to expression in how the community that embraces the particular
religion worships. But the worldview will also come to expression
in how it wants its children to be educated, in what it thinks the
policy of the state should be on such matters as welfare, abortion,
and international law, in what it thinks about art and business, and
so forth. The right to free exercise of one’s religion is thus far
more comprehensive than the right to worship freely. 337
This is echoed in the language of Dignitatis Humanae arguing that religious acts
transcend “the order of terrestrial and temporal affairs” and that “[t]he social nature
of man . . . itself requires that he should give external expression to his internal acts of
religion: that he should share with others on matters religious; that he should profess
his religion in community.” 338 It anticipates the insights of postliberal theology on the
relationship between religion and the larger society.
Indeed, looking at asymmetry through the lens of institutions and the value of
the decentralized generation of norms simply underscores the problematic nature of
asymmetry. It does not prevent the state from “taking sides” or “weighing in.” It
merely ensures that it will do so in a way that is calculated to privilege the secular and
those who, because of the nature of their religious beliefs or a willingness to subordinate them to a public secularity, prefer or are content with a naked public square.
This marginalizes both the individuals who are unprotected, and the religious
mediating institutions to which they belong. While it is inevitable that government
speech will confer both advantage and disadvantage, an asymmetry that turns on explicitly religious language does so in a way that tilts the playing field. The “danger
facing those who disagree with the state’s views,” one scholar has noted, “most often”
is “not from any plausible fear of classic censorship—that is, overt punishment for
offering views repugnant to state authorities—but, rather, from being drowned out of
the marketplace by the often superior resources of the state.” 339
This “drowning out,” runs in one direction. As Richard Garnett observes, we have
become “hard-wired now to think that faith is non-reason” and that “religion is regarded, even by many of the religious, as an expression of subjective longings, of
autonomous self-expression and direction, and of consumer preferences, rather than
as a response to a set of proposed truth-claims about the meaning of life and the destiny of the person.” 340 The predicate of religious equality is that “religion does not
337
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matter, at least not in the public domain.” 341 Indeed, members of the Court have,
from time to time, treated religious perspectives as irrational. 342 Once again, Chase
Harper is not told to repudiate his religion, but to keep it in his car with all of those
other things that are irrelevant to his role as a public citizen. He may enter the circle,
but only on his terms.
Perhaps the threat is overstated. Proponents of more or less strict separation argue
that the United States has remained a religious nation notwithstanding, or perhaps
even because of, the separation of church and state.343 This is even so, they continue,
in comparison to many Western democracies that have an established church.344 This
argument should indeed give pause to those who seek active state promotion of their
religious viewpoint.
It is also the case that the constitutional regime requiring a more rigorous separation of religion and the state is of relatively recent origin, and corresponds with an
era when religious observance in the United States has, in fact, declined.345 This does
not mean that constitutional doctrine caused this decline, but it does militate against
a facile assumption that one can empirically demonstrate the way in which that doctrine has protected religious vibrancy. Nor does it seem that the association of religious
vibrancy or decline with constitutional doctrine tells us anything about whether it protects religion from the state in a way that nonestablishment was intended to secure.
Even if one assumes, for example, a connection between declining religious observance and a more separationist constitutional doctrine, some would certainly argue
that this is the result of the suspension of government support for religion (“evening
the playing field” for irreligion) than it is of government sponsored secularism (“tilting
the playing field” in favor of irreligion).
But, as we have seen, if constitutional doctrine runs the risk of affecting—or
taking sides regarding—the way in which citizens view religion, it is not so much in
favor of godlessness, but of certain assumptions about the relationship between religious belief and life in the larger society. If one believes the claims of scholars, such
341
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as Alan Wolfe, religion in America has largely become nondogmatic, tolerant, and
inclusive. 346 Perhaps this is desirable, but, if we believe our rhetoric about neutrality
and nonendorsement, it ought not be facilitated by constitutional doctrine.
D. The Impact of Asymmetry Upon Religion: A Possible Narrative
Full consideration of the impact of state policy on religion and public secularity
is beyond the scope of this article. By way of example, however, political scientist
Hugh Heclo traced the twentieth century project, embodied in the Progressive movement, to secularize public education and what he called the rise of the “consumption
arts” embodying an implicit philosophy of “meaning . . . constructed by individuals
making a myriad of wholly self-referential consumer choices,” to include a secular
public ethos, celebrating tolerance, democracy, and individual choice:347
With “God talk” set out of bounds, the young democrat undergoing
such an education was invited to identify with America’s secular
democratic heroes: Emerson’s “endless seeker,” Thoreau’s individual moving to the beat of a different drummer, W hitman’s
singer of songs democratic to himself: “Healthy, free, the world
before me / The long brown path before me, leading wherever I
choose.” The all but inescapable implication was that to journey
toward self-discovery, one had to leave behind the religion of
churches, parents, hand-me-down doctrines, and any idea of natural
law. Instead the individual is called to enter a liberated condition
of being free to choose among the ideas and practices of any or no
religion without being judged or casting judgments. Personal
freedom is the ultimate root of moral obligations.348
This move was not always in opposition to organized religion, but interacted
with it. In Heclo’s view, modern secular liberalism drew on the moral heritage of
the Judeo-Christian tradition while its message to the churches was “to drop the supernatural baggage.” 349 Only a few—particularly within the Protestant mainline— were
willing to, if not to drop it, at least to de-emphasize it.
Thus, civil society increasingly came to see that “the social ethic of equality, freedom, and justice was derived from democratic society itself, with one’s religious outlook a purely private appendage”350 within the realm of private choice. This set of
346
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cultural assumptions underlies the Court’s early move to strict separation.351 We can
see them in the Court’s assumption that religion is “private,” 352 and what one commentator called our increasing tendency to see religion and rationality as occupying
separate realms.353 As Heclo observed, “[m]ore than ever before, cultural authority
was a politically contested concept by Americans who no longer seemed to share the
same moral universe.” 354
This problem is accentuated by the second move—that is, the increased involvement of the government in matters with which religion is traditionally concerned.
But, as Heclo observed, this movement went beyond a mere expansion of government to the view that “the one thing of supreme importance in politics is government
policy.” 355 In a trend that he believed characterized both the political left and right,
Heclo noted that “[t]o become more democratic was to become committed to a neverending policy agenda of social problem-solving.”356 This expanding political agenda,
moreover, included issues that went “well beyond the older economic agenda of the
New Deal” to include those that “directly challenged traditional views of the family,
women, sexual morality, and the self-validating quality of personal choice.” 357
In other words, the agenda of public policy expanded at the same time that society
increasingly ceased to hold the same moral—and religious—presuppositions related
to that agenda. These developments are certainly attributable, in a greater or lesser
degree, to social forces other than our Establishment Clause jurisprudence. They may
or may not, in and of themselves, be a good thing. But the interpretation of neutrality
as a rigorous nonendorsement limited to expressly theological propositions, is anything
but neutral toward them. It is undoubtedly affected by them even as it contributes
to them.
IV. S EEKING E STABLISHMENT C LAUSE S YMMETRY
Much of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence and theory has reacted to
the changed role of the contemporary state by expanding the reach of disestablishment
as the government’s role has grown. To believe that the modest governments of the
late eighteenth century ought not to establish churches or prescribe religious doctrine
does not necessarily imply that, if government chooses to involve itself in education
351

See supra Part I. A.
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (“[R]eligion must be a private
matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice.”).
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H ECLO , supra note 308, at 103.
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Id. at 101.
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Id.; see also Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 H ARV . L. R EV . 1059,
1088 (1980) (“The evolution of liberalism thus can be understood as an undermining of the
vitality of all groups that had held an intermediate position between what we now think of as
the sphere of the individual and that of the state.”).
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or social welfare, all religious messages must be excluded. But there is no logical
need to do so. The expansion of the modern state reflected a change in notions
regarding not just the size but the scope of government. Coming to see disestablishment as a guarantee of secularized public space or a requirement of a thoroughgoing
public neutrality is a conceptual choice that is distinct and not necessarily compelled
by the idea of disestablishment. Put another way, the imperative of separation may
have been necessary and workable as applied to the activities of seventeenth century
government. 358 It may be neither today.
One potential solution for Establishment Clause asymmetry would be to require
that the state remain neutral among all points of view rooted in religious belief, or that
it must acknowledge the presence of a religious perspective whenever some citizens
feel that it is pertinent; or (and this may be compelled by that kind of neutrality), it
would simply withdraw from those areas of life with which religion is concerned—
that is, those areas that are committed to another sphere.
While it may be prudent and wise policy for the state to tread lightly in such areas,
such a constitutional mandate would be unworkable and politically impossible. In a
religiously diverse society, it could not be implemented in an evenhanded way without
severely truncating the scope of government in a way that is impossible to imagine
today. Such is the lesson of Establishment Clause asymmetry. Nor would it be desirable. There are certain perspectives— say those of Christian Dominionists, Islamic
Jihadists or White Supremacists—that the government ought to discourage. Is there
a better way to accommodate protection of religious dissidents without unduly restricting the expressive functions of government?
Again, consideration of the role and importance of mediating institutions may help
us. If the objective is to ensure that the state “assists” but does not “usurp” mediating
structures and that it not become Kuyper’s “octopus,” then it may be that the question
of establishment is about whether the state is acting to facilitate religious liberty in the
broader sense suggested by the need for vigorous religious communities. The focus
would turn from a rigid jurisdictional examination (for example: has government
done something “religious”) to a more consequentialist inquiry. In other words, given
the scope of the government’s activities, has its efforts to acknowledge the religious
life of its citizens or to express messages pertinent to religious choices unduly interfered with individual liberty and the proper sphere of religious institutions?
A. “No Establishment” Means . . . No Establishment
Father Thomas Curry has argued that eighteenth century establishment was understood to refer to a church which the government funded and controlled and in which
358

See, e.g., Kevin Pybas, Does The Establishment Clause Require Religion to Be
Confined to the Private Sphere?, 40 V AL. U. L. R EV . 71, 85 (2005) (asking whether “given
that Jefferson’s and Madison’s views on religious liberty were part of a set of beliefs that also
included belief in limited government, does it make sense to invoke the former when we have
rejected the latter?”).
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government used its coercive power to encourage participation.359 Professor Gedicks
has made the same point: a classic eighteenth century establishment was a state
church supported by taxation and, to which, perhaps allegiance was either required
or rewarded with concrete privileges.360 But what does it mean to institutionally separate church and state, particularly in an era where neither the government, nor the
church may look much like they did in the eighteenth century?
“No establishment,” however, presumes that at least some religion will express
itself in institutional structures. Thus, the government ought not to be in the business
of running churches. It ought not, in the words of Lemon, become excessively entangled in the operation of religious institutions.361 It may not proclaim that Christianity
is the official religion of the United States. It ought not to directly fund churches,
discipline or regulate clergy, prescribe ecclesiastical rules, etc. All of this would be
prohibited under current Establishment Clause doctrine.
But how far do these restrictions go? Kyle Duncan has argued, through the lens
of subsidiarity, that “state authority and a religious association should never coalesce
into an identical, entirely overlapping entity.”362 The reason, seen in terms of intermediating institutions, is that such a coalescence will impair or even absorb the function of
alternative spheres.363 In terms of a substantive neutrality rooted in a concern for individual religious freedom, it will have crossed the hazy line separating acknowledgment
from prescription.
I am afraid that there is no easy way to determine when that line has been crossed.
We have already seen that the modern state does many things to which religious perspectives are pertinent and which may have a significant impact upon religious beliefs
and the political and social status of believers. One way to define establishment might
be to require a presumption that government actions have a “secular” or, perhaps more
accurately, a “temporal” purpose. Government actions, in the words of Daniel Conkle,
generally ought to have a “worldly” purpose: whatever its religious motivation or
grounding, its actions are concerned with “non-spiritual human behavior in the physical world.” 364 In other words, even when engaging in religious expression, it ought
to be motivated by the desire to accomplish a secular or temporal result: something
other than a desire to define religious doctrine or to engage in advocacy on matters
that are wholly theological or spiritual.365
359
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This may be a useful guidepost, but it cannot function as a “test.” There may be
occasions where acknowledgment of belief—without more—ought to be permitted.
There are times when government acts to acknowledge the history and culture of its
citizens. Kuyper’s Anti-Revolutionary Party, for example, called for state recognition
and facilitation of the Lord’s Day, 366 and Kuyper himself reportedly expressed admiration for the fact that Americans opened sessions of Congress and military campaigns
with prayer.367 This alone may not help us decide many difficult twenty-first century
cases, but there are at least two other principles that may provide further guidance.
B. No Establishment Means No Coercion
Concurring in Van Orden, Justice Thomas argued that establishment requires
“actual legal coercion.” 368 While coercion may not always be necessary, it should
certainly be sufficient.
But coercion must be properly understood. We cannot make “the social world . . .
acceptable to every last individual.” 369 Justice Kennedy 370 (and Justice Jackson before him)371 observed that the Constitution was not intended to and cannot protect
individual choice or the state’s maintenance of open forum. Although some argue that the sine
qua non of disestablishment is the prohibition of the direct or indirect allocation of tax dollars
for religious purposes, this, too, cannot survive the expansion of government. It is difficult
to see how an agnostic is any more aggrieved by funding a nondenominational prayer, than an
evangelical might be by the knowledge that her tax dollars are used to fund thoroughly secular
approaches to areas of life in which she believes that faith is indispensable. If liberty of conscience is threatened by requiring one to fund proselytizing for a God that does not exist, then
why is it not similarly threatened by diverting tax funds to promote, or at least model, the
notion that a comprehensive life view, or attention to life’s most difficult questions, can and
are routinely answered without a God who one believes to be sovereign?
366
B O LT , supra note 330, at 343 (citing A BRAH AM K U Y PER , O N S P ROGRAM 2, 71 (J.H.
Kruyt 1880)).
367
Id. at 343–44. This, too, is implied by a view of society in which the alternative spheres
cooperate in tension and in which, as postliberal theologians and sociologists of religion tell
us, what happens in the “secular” world is inextricably bound with what happens in the
“religious” world.
368
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Lee v. W eisman, 505 U.S. 573, 640 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The coercion that was
a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and
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minorities from feeling like, well, minorities. 372 Coercion must involve the threat
of a sanction.373 As Jeffrie Murphy has written, “[t]rue duress [coercion], to put it
crudely, requires not merely an unhappy choice but a villain who is responsible for
creating the necessity of making that choice.” 374 While coercion can certainly result
from psychological or social sanction—“pressure that no one could reasonably
resist”375 —it is also the case that psychological pressure may simply reflect the way
things are—the “breaks” to use the vernacular. Distinguishing the two necessarily
involves a decision about the way things should be, a theory as to which pressures are
and are not legitimate.
As we have seen, it is impossible to prevent all instances in which, as a result
of some state action, a person faces social pressure to remain polite and respectful
when her religious beliefs require her to do otherwise. To regard the mere exposure
to religious assertions, such as nondenominational prayer at graduation ceremonies,
as “coercive” is to make a judgment that exposure to such prayer as a condition of
attendance is unreasonable. It reflects a judgment that even very subtle pressure to
act in a way— or to appear to affirm something—that is contrary to one’s religious
presuppositions is illegitimate.
But, again, this is a principle that we cannot live by. In Mozert, as a condition of
attendance, plaintiffs believed that to require their children to listen quietly to a teacher
reading material that they regard as blasphemous violated religious duty.376 There are
those for whom standing during prayer is an affirmation of, or participation in, the
prayer. But there is little reason to regard the sensibilities of the latter as different in
kind from those of the former. One who stands respectfully or sits quietly during a
prayer—or even during discourse that contradicts her religious beliefs—is simply
standing respectfully or sitting quietly.377
Even if the state can reasonably be seen as endorsing particular religious sentiments through the sponsoring of the graduation prayer, it hardly follows that it is passing judgment on nonadherents. I teach at a Catholic law school which opens most
major school events with (generally nondenominational) prayer—the content of which
372
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it presumably unambiguously endorses (for example, there is a God and She cares for
lawyers). There are crucifixes on our walls, yet our diverse student body prospers.378
Certainly the imposition of penalties or legal disabilities upon nonadherents
would amount to impermissible coercion. In such cases, as James Beattie writes, the
“government is sending a sheriff, not a message.” 379 But for psychological pressure
to constitute coercion, it must amount to something more than a reminder that one is
a religious minority and that others in the community have other beliefs. It must constitute more than a perception that the government has “endorsed” or “acknowledged”
beliefs that one does not share.
C. Nonestablishment Means Religious Tolerance
This is not to suggest that institutional establishment or coercion is the only way
in which the government can run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Disestablishment prohibits more than theocracy and inquisition. William Galston has defined
“expressive liberty” as “[t]he ability of individuals and groups to live in ways consistent with their understanding of what gives meaning and purpose to life . . . .” 380
Nonestablishment ought to require that government refrain from placing undue pressure on the expressive liberty of religious dissenters and their ability to pursue their
own beliefs and practices. In terms of intermediary institutions, the question becomes
one of whether the state has used its power in a way that threatens to unduly impede,
displace or corrupt the sphere of the church.
For cases that do not amount to classic establishments or legal coercion, the focus
of the inquiry should shift from a series of binary questions—“does the government
have an improper purpose?” or, “can a government message or practice be reasonably
perceived as an endorsement of religion or as advancing or inhibiting religion?”—to
a qualitative one assessing the burden placed on nonadherents.
The question ought to be whether government practices or messages with respect
to religion are sufficiently hostile toward those burdened by the practice or message
such that continued adherence to their beliefs (or lack of belief) would become unreasonably difficult. Government action becomes “practically coercive” when it creates
a substantial threat to religious pluralism or of suppressing religious differences.381
This is a form of “substantive neutrality,” but a more modest form. It seeks only

378

I acknowledge that our students knew we are a Jesuit school when they decided to come
to Marquette, but it is not evident that our student body is any less diverse or that our
students are “hardier” when faced with challenges to their predispositions.
379
James R. Beattie, Jr., Taking Liberalism and Religious Liberty Seriously: Shifting Our
Notion of Toleration from Locke to Mill, 43 C ATH . L AW . 367, 402 (2004).
380
W ILLIAM A. G ALSTO N , T H E P RACTICE O F L IBERAL P LU RALISM 68–69 (2005).
381
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 H ARV . L. R EV . 1409, 1516 (1990).

58

W ILLIAM & M ARY B ILL OF R IGHTS J OURNAL

[Vol. 18:1

rough justice. While this test is necessarily subjective, there are some guiding principles that we may discern.382
As is the case today, government may take a position on secular matters that are
inconsistent with those based in the religious views of some citizens. But these positions ought not to be rendered constitutionally problematic simply because the state
acknowledges their religious provenance or uses religious language. Nor should
these messages be free of scrutiny simply because they avoid religious language or
extratemporal assertions.383 These positions become constitutionally problematic,
not simply when they are mixed with theological propositions, but when they can be
reasonably interpreted as reading the religious group out of the political community
or usurping the role of religious institutions.
In contrast to current doctrine, this model would not presume that the mere
endorsement of a religious proposition renders nonadherents disfavored members of
the citizens, but asks whether the particular endorsement actually does so. While I can
think of no simple test for determining when this has happened, one relevant question
might be whether a message with religious implications claims that adherents are not
good citizens or are proper objects of public derision or ostracism. While the extent
to which a government message includes theological assertions or claims of exclusivity are certainly relevant to this inquiry, they are not controlling.
Under the model proposed here, courts may not dispose of establishment claims
by assuming that almost all religious claims and virtually no secular claims cause constitutional injury. Courts have been reluctant to probe deeply into religious claims,
often adhering to what has been referred to as the “no religious decisions” rule. Indeed,
the regime of Smith can be seen as driven by that reluctance. But this aversion to the
assessment of religious claims has not been as absolute as claimed, and courts are not
unfamiliar with assessing the magnitude of the claimed injury.384 In the free exercise
context (at least before Smith) and under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, they
have often assessed whether a government action constitutes a substantial burden on
free exercise. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,385 for
example, the Supreme Court rejected a free exercise challenge to the construction of
a logging road through an area of the Six Rivers National Forest regarded to be sacred
by several Indian tribes. The Court rejected the claim, noting that they were not
“coerced by the Government’s action into violating their religious beliefs”nor did the
“governmental action penalize religious activity by denying [the plaintiffs] an equal
share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.” 386
382
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In Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service,387 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
rejected an RFRA challenge to a plan to create artificial snow on a mountain regarded to be sacred by a number of tribes. Either in and of itself or by virtue of the
presence of a small amount of human waste in the water to be used, the tribes argued
that the plan would impair their religious practices.388 Noting that the tribes retained
access to the mountain for worship, the majority concluded that injury to the tribes’
“subjective spiritual experience” is not a sufficiently “substantial burden” on their
religious practices under the RFRA.389
Although I may not agree that constitutionally cognizable religious injury must
involve “coercion” or “penalty” and cannot be “merely” subjective, characterizing a
claim in this way does require a court to evaluate its nature. While there is much more
to be said, assessment—not of the truth of the claim—but of the nature and extent of
the injury said to flow from it is not beyond judicial competence.
C ONCLUSION
We come to our Establishment Clause asymmetry honestly. There are, indeed,
dangers from an overly close association of church and state. But as the state expands,
those dangers are not avoided by a jurisprudence that turns on the facial secularity
of state messages. Doctrine that seeks to protect both religion and irreligion from
subtle expressive harm is unworkable and will inevitably be compromised. Our own
compromises have tilted the playing field in favor of the secular state and against the
social and cultural relevance of religious institutions. A new paradigm is in order.
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